AHMEDABAD CITY MUNICIPALITY Vs. VADILAL VAKHATCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a revisional application against the order passed in revision by the Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad against the order of the First Class Magistrate passed in appeal, against a notice of demand, under Section 110 of Bombay Act XVIII of 1925. It is urged by Mr. Thakor that no revisional application lies to this Court. Section 110 of Act XVIII of 1925 corresponds to Section 86 of Bombay Act III of 1901, and according to the ruling of this Court in In re Dulsukhram (1907) 9 Bom. L.R. 1347 a Magistrate hearing an appeal under Section 86 of the Bombay District Municipal Act of 1901, was merely an appellate authority having jurisdiction given by the Act to deal with the question of a civil liability, and was, therefore, not an inferior criminal Court, to which alone the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court applied under Section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It is urged, on the other hand, by Mr. Divatia that a revisional application lies under s. Ill of Bombay Act XVIII of 1925 which lays down that the decision of the Magistrate or Bench of Magistrates upon any appeal shall, at the instance of either party, be subject to revision by the Court to which appeals against his or their decisions ordinarily lie It is urged that a revisional application would lie, therefore, to the Court to which appeals against the decision of the Magistrate would ordinarily lie, and when this revisional power is exercised by a Court, its decision would be subject to revision by the High Court. We think, however, that this is a matter relating to a civil liability and the intention of the legislature was, under the old Section 86, to give only one remedy by way of an appeal to the Magistrate or Bench of Magistrates. By Section 111, Sub-section (1), which is badly drafted, a further remedy is given by way of revision against the order of the Magistrate or Bench of Magistrates on appeal against the notice of demand to the Court to which appeals against his or their decisions ordinarily lie. We think that in the absence of any specific provision, a further re-visional application would not lie at the instance of any of the parties. THIS conclusion would seem to follow from the terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 111 of the Act. We think, therefore, that there is no right conferred by the statute on any of the aggrieved parties to make a furthar application for revision against the order passed by the Sessions Court in revision of the order passed by the Magistrate on appeal, against a notice of demand, under Section 110. We think that the preliminary objection taken by Me, Thakor succeeds.

(2.) WE, therefore, discharge the rule.