JHANAKLAL Vs. GULABCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. In this case the dealings-between the parties, had admittedly ceased on 3rd June 1921. On 13th June 1924, that is, over three years later, the defendant-applicant executed a sarkafr admitting liability. The civil Court vacation extended until 16th June 1927, and it is urged on behalf of the present applicant, on the strength of the decision in Bai Hemhore v. Masamalli [1902] 26 Bom. 782, that the acknowledgment having been executed after the three years had expired the suit was barred.

(2.) THE only question for decision, therefore, is whether this acknowledgment can be said to have been executed before the expiration of the period prescribed for the suit. Admittedly, if the acknowledgment had been signed before 3rd June 1924, the suit could have been filed on 16th June 1924. Now Section 3, Lim. Act, specifically makes Schedule 1 thereof applicable subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25. Section 4 similarly, makes allowance for the intervention of the vacation of a Court. In my opinion, therefore, the effect of Sections 3 and 4 is to extend the period prescribed for any suit in Schedule 1 in the special circumstances-contemplated by Section 4. la those circumstances, I am of opinion, with all deference to the learned Chief Justice, who decided Bai Hemkore v. Masamalli [1902] 26 Bom. 782, quoted above, that the present acknowledgment must be held to have been made within the period prescribed by limitation for the suit we are considering, for that period, in reality, amounted to not merely three years, but three years plus the unexpired portion of the vacation. In those circumstances, I am of opinion that the suit was not barred, the acknowledgment having been given within the prescribed time for limitation as laid down in Section 19, Lim. Act, read with Sections 3 and 4 idem. The contrary view, in my opinion, introduces a grave anomaly because, in an ordinary case, an acknowledgment of the kind contemplated by Section 19, Lim. Act, sets up a fresh period of limitation, if it is given before the period prescribed for the suit expires. If, under another provision of the Limitation Act, as is the case here, the period of limitation can be extended, it would seem both proper and reasonable, that neither debtor nor creditor should be deprived of the benefit granted by Section 19, Lim. Act. The benefit granted to the creditor is, of course, obvious, but, even in the case of a debtor, it is often advantageous to be able to grant a fresh acknowledgment and so stave off the early institution of the suit impending against him.