CORPORATION OF MADRAS Vs. SAKHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 9 in the suit are stall-holders in the Moore Market, Madras. This is a public market in which there are altogether about 300 stalls and stall- holders. It is owned by the Corporation of Madras, the defendant in the suit. The stall-holders carry on various trades and businesses and sell their wares to the members of the public. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 9 allege that they were tenants of their respective stalls prior to September, 1944. It is not in dispute that they were stall- holders prior to that date ; but the Corporation disputes that they were tenants but alleges that they were mere licensees. The tenth plaintiff is an association, the members of which are stall-holders in the Moore Market, including plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 9, and the association seeks to represent in the suit the entire body of all stall- holders.

(2.) It is beyond doubt that prior to the year 1936, each stall-holder entered into an agreement with the Corporation through its Commissioner, who is the authority directed by Section 80 of the Madras City Municipal Act to make agreements on its behalf During the trial the first plaintiff produced an uncompleted printed form of agreement, which is the Corporation's own form, and said he had, in the first instance, entered into a contract with the Corporation upon one of those forms. During the trial two completed forms of agreement were exhibited, Ex. P-1 (a), dated the 22nd July, 1931, and Ex. P-28 dated the 5 October, 1937, the latter is an agreement with the third plaintiff. Whatever the exact position of the several plaintiffs may be and the difference, if any, between the position of one plaintiff and the Corporation as compared with that of another plaintiff and the Corporation, it is manifest that the suit was tried and conducted upon the basis that the interests of each of plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 9 originated under an agreement in the form which I have mentioned ; and also, that the merits were considered solely from the aspect of the plaintiffs interests having commenced and originated pursuant to agreements of the sort indicated. This is quite clear from the observations of the learned trial Judge who said that the only issue which he had to decide was whether the Corporation could levy distress for recovering not only the old rates of fees which the plaintiffs were, under their contracts with the Corporation, liable to pay but also the excess amounts claimed by the Corporation under notices which they had served upon the plaintiff-stall-holders. I have mentioned this because during the argument, an endeavour was made to distinguish between the positions of several plaintiffs and others in order to manifest that some of the plaintiffs may not be able to call in aid the effect of the provisions of the agreement. But when the observations of the learned Judge, to which reference has just been made, were pointed out, the argument regarding a distinction between the position of any plaintiff, was not pursued.

(3.) The agreement contains the following relevant provisions. It is made between the Corporation and the individual or firm therein called " the tenant ". It provides that the Corporation agreed to let and the tenant to take a specified stall at a stated rent from the date of the agreement. It was expressly agreed that the tenancy could be determined by either party giving to the other one month's notice of intention to terminate. The payment which the tenant was required to make is described as rent. It was further agreed that if the tenant made default in payment of rent or failed to perform any stipulation on his part or to observe or conform to all the rules and regulations from time to time made by the Corporation with regard to the stall, it should be lawful for the Corporation to re- enter upon the stall and thereupon the demise should absolutely determine. The agreement does not provide for an increase in the rent reserved during its currency.