Y L PAUL Vs. GCJOSEPH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application to revise an order of the District Munsiff of Bezwada directing a decree to be passed in terms of an award dated 26 Novem-ber, 1944. The dispute in which this award was given was one between two brothers in respect of business they carried on under the name or style of "Y.L. Mark, Paul and Co." They were engaged on military contracts. The dispute was admittedly referred to 15 persons who made an award on the 26 November, 1944. The President of the arbitrators, or Umpire, as he has been referred to for con- venience in the Court below, filed the award in Court under the provisions of Section 14. It has been found that the parties were given notice, both of the making of the award and of its filing in Court. The present applicant, one of the brothers, objected to the passing of the decree on a number of grounds of which three have been agitated again before me. In the first place, he objects on the ground that admittedly, only 14 of the 15 arbitrators signed the award. This, he says, is fatal to the validity of the award by reason of the provision of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act. I do not consider that there is any substance in this objection. By Section 10(2) of the Act the reference in this case must be regarded as one expressly containing a provision that the award of the majority shall prevail, as there was admittedly no provision to the contrary in the reference. Here 14 of the 15 arbitrators have signed the award and it has been found that, in fact, all the 15 were present and took part in the deliberations preceding the making of the award. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the award must be regarded as valid and binding, inasmuch as it is signed by a majority of the arbitrators. With great respect I agree with the decision in Raghubir Pandey v. Kaulesar Pandey (1944) I.L.R. 23 Pat. 719, where the authorities on this point have been dealt with at length.

(2.) The second objection arises from the applicant's contention that he is entitled to show grounds upon which the award can be set aside, notwithstanding, as is admitted, that he is barred by limitation from making an application with that object. His objection on this ground was not filed until the 28 April, 1945, whilst the award was made on the 26 November, 1944, and it was filed in Court on the 24 February, 1945. Thus, it is clear that the applicant was not entitled to apply to set aside the award on the 28 April, 1945, when he filed his objections. It is urged on his behalf, however, that he is nevertheless entitled to resist the filing of the award. Again, I cannot accept the contention. I am satisfied that such a contention must fail in view of the provision of Section 17 of the Act a mandatory provision--that the Court should proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award when the time for making an application has expired.

(3.) The third and last objection raised is that the so-called award was not a final conclusion. I have perused the award and it is clearly of a final and conclusive nature.