ANDRE PAUL TERENCE AMBARD Vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the Supreme Court of Trinidad and Tobago ordering the appellant to pay a fine of ?25 or in default to be imprisoned for one month for contempt of Court, and further ordering him to pay the costs of the proceedings as between solicitor and client. The first question that arises is whether, as contended by the respondent, the Privy Council is incompetent to entertain an appeal from an order of a Court of Record inflicting a penalty for contempt of Court. The decisions on the point are conflicting. In Rainy V/s. Justices of Sierra Leone, (1852) 8 Moo PC 47, a Board consisting of Lord Cranworth, Knight Bruce L.J., Dr. Lushington and Sir Edward Ryan undoubtedly decided that no such appeal lay. Lord Cranworth, in giving the judgment of the Board, after pointing out that in this country every Court of Record is the sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a contempt of Court proceeded: We are of opinion that it is a Court of Record, and that the law must be considered the same there as in this country; and therefore that the orders made by the Court in the exercise of its discretion, imposing these fines for contempts, are conclusive, and cannot be questioned by another Court; and we do not consider that there is any remedy by petition to the Judicial Committee to review the propriety of such orders.

(2.) The argument, with respect, is not convincing, for it would, seem to apply equally to all decisions in criminal cases which at that time in both this country and the colony were conclusive and could not be questioned by any Court. In McDermott V/s. Chief Justice of British Guiana. (1868) 2 PC 341, leave to appeal from a committal for contempt had been given "without prejudice to the competency of Her Majesty to entertain an appeal." At the hearing the Board, consisting of Lord Chelmsford, Wood, L.J., Sir James Colvile and Sir E. Vaughan Williams, treated the hearing as a motion to revoke the leave. An incidental question was whether the Court that imposed the penalty was a Court of Record and in giving the judgment of the Board Lord Chelmsford said that the applicant had to show either that the Court was not a Court of Record or that if it was, yet there was something in the order which rendered it improper and therefore the subject of appeal. He proceeded to say: Not a single case is to be found where there has been a committal by one of the Colonial Courts for contempt, where it appeared clearly upon the face of the order that the party had committed a contempt, that he had been duly summoned, and that the punishment awarded for the contempt was an appropriate one, in which this Committee has ever entertained an appeal against an order of this description.

(3.) It would appear to their Lordships that the grounds of decision assume that jurisdiction exists at any rate in cases where it does not appear on the face of the order that the party had committed a contempt, etc. Whether this means that if the order merely recited that a contempt had been committed without more the Board would examine the alleged contempt is not clear. But in Surendranath Banerji y. Chief Justice of Bengal, (1883) 10 Cal 109, on an appeal from a committal for contempt by the High Court in Calcutta, the Board examined the written article which was complained of and said that it was clearly a contempt of Court. They set out the passage from 2 PC 341 (2) at p. 363, which has just been quoted, and proceeded: Their Lordships having decided that the libel was a contempt of Court, and that the High Court had jurisdiction to commit the petitioner for a period of two months, the case is not a proper one for an appeal to Her Majesty.