GOVERNMENT OF PROVINCE OF MADRAS THROUGH COLLECTOR OF RAMNAD Vs. ALARRMVELLAYAN CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondents l and 2 are the proprietors of the village of Karaikudi. They instituted a suit in the Court of the District Munsif of Devakottah against the Provincial Government and the Municipal Council of Karaikudi for a decree setting aside a decision of a Survey Officer, under the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923. Section 14 of the Act gives an aggrieved party the right of bringing a suit to challenge a decision of the Survey Officer, provided he does so within three years from the date of the notification of the order. The suit was filed on 13th September 1936, which was within the time allowed, and the plaintiffs averred that they had given to the defendants the notice required by law. The defendants filed separate written statements on 3 February 1937, but no objection was taken by them to the validity of the notice. Before the District Munsif a question arose with regard to the value of the subject-matter of the suit and it was eventually decided that the value exceeded that of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif. Consequently, on 30 November 1938, the plaint was returned to the plaintiffs for presentation to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottah. It was presented to the Subordinate Judge's Court on 13 September 1939. On 23 March 1940, the Municipal Council filed a fresh written statement and their example was followed by the Provincial Government on 29 of that month. In the new written statements objection was taken to the validity of the notice. A preliminary issue was framed on this question on 12 November 1940 and was decided by the Subordinate Judge in favour of the plaintiffs. The case was then tried on the merits and resulted in the order of the Survey Officer being set aside. The appeal has been filed by the Provincial Government against this decree. The Municipal Council, as respondent 3, supports the appellant.

(2.) The Provincial Government says that the notice which it received did not comply with the requirements of Section 80 as it was only given on behalf of one of the proprietors, whereas there are admittedly two proprietors. The Subordinate Judge held that it sufficiently indicated that there were two proprietors; but here he clearly erred and the Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents rightly has made no attempt to support the judgment on this ground. The Subordinate Judge also held that the defendants had waived their right to question the notice and that in any event they were estopped by their conduct from saying that it was bad. The plaintiffs-respondents maintain that here the Subordinate Judge was right.

(3.) Section 80, Civil P.C., says that no suit shall be instituted against the Crown or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such officer in his official capacity, until the expiry of two months next after notice in writing has been given of the claim. The section requires that the notice shall state the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief that he claims and that the plaint shall contain a statement that the notice has been served. Section 350, Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920, contains similar provisions with regard to suits against Municipal Councils. Before the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagchand Dagadusa V/s. Secretary of State , there was some divergence of opinion in India with regard to the interpretation of Section 80, Civil P.C., but their Lordships decision in that case set all doubt at rest. They said that the section is express, explicit and mandatory, and it admits of no implications or exceptions. They added that it imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court.