CHIEF INSPECTOR OF STAMPS Vs. RAMESH CHANDRA ADOPTED SON OF BSHEO PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision by the Chief Inspector of Stamps under Section 6B of the amended Court-fees Act (7 of 1870). It arises out of Suit No. 42 of 1941 filed by the opposite party, Ramesh Chandra in the Court of the Civil Judge at Aligarh against his adoptive mother, Smt. Rama Devi, the widow o? one B. Sheo Prasad. Ramesh Chandra alleged, in his plaint, that he was the validly adopted son of Babu Sheo Prasad and had inherited certain properties in that capacity on his father's death on 9 January 1924. These properties were set out in Schedule A attached to the plaint. Certain other properties were set out in Schedules B and C to the plaint. With regard to the former, the plaintiff's case was that they had been purchased by the defendant out of the funds belonging to the plaintiff as the adopted son of B. Sheo Prasad but mutation in respect of those properties had been effected jointly in the names of the plaintiff and the defendant. With regard to the latter, the plaintiff alleged that though these properties had been purchased out of the income of the plaintiff's estate yet they have been mutated in the name of the defendant alone. All the properties mentioned in Schedules A, B and C were lumped together by the plaintiff in Schedule p and he alleged that his title to these properties as the adopted son of B. Sheo Prasad had been denied by the defendant.

(2.) The plaintiff further alleged that he was a minor at the date of his father's death and continued to be so until 13 August 1988 and during this period the defendant who had obtained a certificate of guardianship relating to the person and property of the plaintiff from the Court of the District Judge at Aligarh remained in occupation and management of the whole property. After the plaintiff had attained majority on 13 August 1938, the defendant applied to the District Judge at Aligarh for being discharged from guardianship but before any order had been passed upon that application the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had been guilty of several acts of misfeasance and non-feasance in respect of the property under her management and he, therefore, made an application to the District Judge that the defendant should be asked to render accounts to the plaintiff for the whole period during which she had managed his properties. The dispute which thus arose between the parties was settled by an oral compromise and in pursuance of that compromise the plaintiff's application was dismissed and the defendant was discharged without having rendered any accounts. One of the terms of this compromise was that certain properties which had been set out in Schedule D attached to the plaint and which had been given to the defendant as a gift by B. Sheo Prasad and constituted her absolute property were to pass to the plaintiff on the death of the defendant who was only to have a life interest in them. Another term of the compromise was that the defendant was to remain in management of the plaintiff's properties. The defendant made a breach of these terms and she executed a will in favour of her daughter, Smt. Manorama Devi in respect of the properties set out in Schedule D and committed several acts of mismanagement and misappropriation of the moneys belonging to the plaintiff. One of these acts alleged by the plaintiff was that the defendant had executed a deed of trust in respect of a dharamshala which had been built on plaintiff's land with plaintiff's money and had appointed a committee for its management. The plaintiff alleged that in accordance with the compromise between him and the defendant he had a vested interest in the properties set out in Schedule D and the will executed by the defendant in respect of that property was inoperative against his interest. He also mentioned in his plaint that besides the properties in suit there were other properties which had devolved upon him in his capacity as the adopted son of B. Sheo Prasad, but as he was in possession of all those properties there was no dispute about them. Upon these allegations the plaintiff claimed thefollowing reliefs: (a) That the Court may be pleased to declare that the plaintiff is the sole owner of all tho3e properties set forth in Schedule F. (b) In case it be found that the plaintiff is not in possession of the properties set forth in Schedule P or is dispossessed from any of them during the pendency of the suit, the Court may be pleased to put him in possession thereof. (c) That the Court may be pleased to declare that the defendant has only a limited interest for her life in the property set forth in Schedule D annexed hereto and that the plaintiff has a vested interest in the remainder. (d) That in ease for completion of his title it be found necessary for the plaintiff to obtain some deed from the defendant, the latter may be compelled to execute the same. (e) That the defendant be ordered to render an account of her management of the plaintiff's estate with effect from 6 September 1939, till such time as she may be found to be in possession, and such sums as may be found due to the plaintiff be awarded to him. (f) That in case the family arrangement referred to hereunder is found void or inoperative, the Court may be pleased to order the defendant to render full and complete accounts from 9 January 1924 to 6 September, 1939, and award the plaintiff such sums as he may be found entitled to. (g) That it be declared that the deed of trust executed by the defendant in respect of the property set forth in Schedule E is null and void. Reliefs (a) and (b) which go together and relate to the properties contained in Schedule A, B and C which have been lumped together in Schedule P were valued by the plaintiff for the purposes of court-fee at ten times the annual revenue of the properties and an ad valorem court- fee of Rs. 1107-8-0 was paid on that amount. Reliefs (c) and (d) which are connected with each other were treated by the plaintiff as mere declaratory reliefs and on each one of them a court-fee of Rs. 15 was paid. Reliefs (e) and (f) also go together and the plaintiff arbitrarily valued the former at Rs. 200 and the latter at Rs. 300 and he paid a court-fee of Rs. 15 in respect of the former and Rs. 22-8-0 in respect of the latter. As regards relief (g) which related to a dharamshala alleged to have been built by the defendant on plaintiff's land out of the moneys belonging to the plaintiff it was valued at Rs. 5000 and an ad valorem court-fee of Rupees 102-8-0 was paid thereon.

(3.) The Chief Inspector of Stamps raised the following objections : (1) With regard to reliefs (a) and (b) he pointed out that it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish his adoption by B. Sheo Prasad and hence he was bound to disclose the value of all the properties which had devolved upon him in his capacity as the adopted son of B. Sheo Prasad. It will be noticed that the plaintiff had stated in his plaint that there were other properties which he had inherited from his adoptive father but he had not mentioned them in the plaint because he was in possession of them and they were not the subject of any dispute between the parties. The objection of the Chief Inspector of Stamps, as we have been able to understand it, was that the plaintiff, was bound to include the value of all those properties also for the purposes of court-fee for it is not claimed that so far as the properties involved in the reliefs (a) and (b) are concerned, the plaintiff has paid ad valorem court-fee on the basis of ten times their annual revenue. (2) With regard to relief (c), the Chief Inspector of Stamps was of the opinion that it involved adjudging void or voidable the will executed by the defendant and hence it fell within the purview of Section 7(iv-A)(1), Court-fees Act, and the plaintiff was bound to pay ad valorem court-fee on the market value of the property involved in the relief. (3) Relief (d), according to the Chief Inspector of Stamps, was a relief in the nature of mandatory injunction under Section 55, Specific Relief Act, and in respect of this relief the plaintiff was bound to pay court-fee on one-tenth of the total valuation of the property affected by the will. (4) With regard to reliefs (e) and (f), which relate to accounting, the objection made by the Chief Inspector of Stamps was that the plaintiff was not entitled to set an arbitrary value on these reliefs for the purposes of court-fee and he should be asked to fix the proper valuation of each relief and should be made to pay the full court-fee thereon. (5) As regards relief (g), the objection was that the plaintiff had undervalued the property involved in this relief because in the trust deed executed by the defendant in respect of this property its value was fixed at Rs. 20,000.