(1.) The petitioner was accused of an offence under Section 471, I.P.C., in a complaint presented by the respondent to the Subdivisional Magistrate, Chidambaram. The complaint was taken on file for offences under Secs.465 and 471, I.P.C., and transferred to the 2nd Class Magistrate of Vridhachalam for preliminary inquiry under Ch. 18, Criminal P.C. The Sub Magistrate recorded a sworn statement from the complainant and issued processes to the accused and witnesses, but before the inquiry could begin he was succeeded by another Magistrate, who heard preliminary arguments and held that the complaint was barred by Section 195, Criminal P.C., because there was no complaint by the District Munsif of Vridhachalam. The Magistrate then passed an order purporting to discharge the accused (the petitioner) under Section 209(2), Criminal P.C. In revision the learned Sessions Judge of South Arcot acting under Section 436, Criminal P.C., set aside the order of discharge and directed the Sub-Magistrate to restore the complaint to file and dispose of it according to law. The accused has prayed that the order of the learned Sessions Judge may be quashed as being contrary to law and without jurisdiction.
(2.) The facts, as alleged in the respondent's complaint are quite simple. Ramanuja Naidu of Melapapanampatti in Vridhachalam Taluk executed on 5th December 1927, a promissory note for Rs. 150, in favour of Kuppuswami Chetti of Melpadi. On 15 October 1930, Kuppuswami Chetty endorsed the promissory note in favour of the respondent. Until 15 October 1930, no endorsement of payment on account of principal or interest had been made on the promissory note and therefore the respondent's claim under it would become barred by limitation on 5 December 1930. On 19 November 1930, the respondent issued a notice to the promisor to which he received no reply. On 2 December, 1930 the respondent arranged with the petitioner, who is, or was then, a vakil's clerk for the filing of a suit on the promissory note in the Court of the District Munsif, Vridhachalam. He sent to the petitioner the promissory note, a vakalat form duly signed, and a blank sheet duly signed on which the plaint might be copied out; he sent also at the same time Rs. 24, for the fees and necessary expenses. The petitioner failed to see that the suit was filed within the period of limitation, but had it filed some time afterwards, and then the promissory note bore an endorsement of the payment of Rs. 2, on 15 March 1929. The respondent accused the petitioner of having somehow forged the endorsement in order to cover up his own offence, and stated that by filing the promissory note in the Court the petitioner had committed an offence under Section 471, I.P.C. The suit was dismissed by the District Munsif on the ground that the claim was barred by limitation. (This appears from the order of the learned District Judge; the records of the suit have not been discussed before me.)
(3.) The Sub-Magistrate took the view that the offence alleged in the complaint was clearly one of intentionally fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in a judicial proceeding ( Section 193, I.P.C.) and that therefore a prosecution was barred by Section 195(1)(b), Criminal P.C., for want of a complaint by the District Munsif in whose Court the false document had been used. There can be no doubt that the person who wrote the false endorsement did so with the intention of causing it to appear that a payment of Rs. 2 had been made on 15 March 1929. That would be an important item of evidence in the suit, because if such a payment had been made, the bar of limitation would be removed. The respondent's contention, which appears to have found favour with the learned Sessions Judge is that the petitioner forged the endorsement not in order to make false evidence for the suit, but in order to cover up his own failure to file the suit in time. This contention is very obviously due to a confusion of motive with intention. No doubt the motive of the petitioner was to save himself from blame for delay in having the suit filed. But the intention of the act of forgery and the intention of the act of filing the forged document, have to be gathered from the acts themselves. The intention with which the forged endorsement was made was to cause it to appear that a payment of Rs. 2 had been made on 15 March 1929. The intention with which the forged document was filed in Court is equally clear; it was to make it appear to the District Munsif who was to try the suit that the claim was not barred by limitation. If the District Munsif believed that, and gave a decree for the plaintiff , the mistake of the respondent would be concealed and he would escape responsibility for the fees which had been entrusted to him. That however, though it may have been the ulterior object which the petitioner desired to gain, was not the intention with which he acted when he filed the promissory note in the Court.