GHAMANDI Vs. PARSHADI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, one by the landlord Ghamandi against the tenant Parshadi and the other by the landlord Sugan against the tenant Mahadeo. In both these applications, Rajasthan Revenue Board and the Chief Secretary, Rajasthan Government have also been arrayed as respondents. The allegations made in Ghamandi's petition are that he is the landlord of Nos. 57, 60, 61, 72, 73, 141, 138, 149, 151, 157, 219, 227, 266, 292, 289, and 276 measuring approximately 15 Bighas situated in Mauza Chahal, Tehsil Biana, Bharatpur District. One fourth of the said land was ploughed and cultivated by his tenant Kanchan during the year the petition was made but the Rajasthan Revenue Board, vide it's order dated 30th November, 1950 in revision against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer Bayana ordered that the respondent No. 1 Parshadi be reinstated to the land under section 7 of the Rajasthan Tenants Protection Ordinance IX of 1949. Sugan in his petition states that he was the land-owner of Khasra plots No. 690 measuring 2 Bighas 7 Biswas, No. 691 measuring 2 bighas 10 biswas and 692 measuring 3 bighas 17 bis-was situated in village Murki in Tehsil Bayana, Bharatpur District. This land was cultivated by his son Shiv Charan in St. 2004 and not by Mahadeo. The said Shiv Charan cultivated the said land in St. 2006 and St. 2007 as well. An application was made by Mahadeo Prasad for his reinstatement under section 7 of the Rajasthan Tenants' Protection Ordinance IX of 1949. The Sub Divisional Officer, Bayana dismissed the application but the Revenue Board of Rajasthan in revision ordered the reinstatement of Mahadeo Prasad. In both the petitions it is contended that Section 7 of the Rajasthan Tenants' Protection Ordinance (herein after to be referred to as the Protection Ordinance) became void under the Constitution of India as it gave protection only to certain tenants and not to all the tenants. The said provisions are therefore void under Article 14 of the Constitution of India which guaranteed equal protection of laws to all the citizens of India. It is ajso contended that the order of the Revenue Board was also inconsistent with Article 31 (1) of the Constitution of India as well as Article 19 (2) (f) of the same Constitution. Both the petitioners therefore, have prayed that the orders of the Revenue Board in both the revisions be quashed and section 7 of the Protection Ordinance be declared void and the tenants who were in possession of the lands in dispute at the time when the respon- dents No. 1 in both the cases were ordered to be reinstated, should be declared entitled to possession.

(2.) On behalf of the respondents, return has been made contending that the orders of the Board of Revenue in both the cases were per fectly legal, that section 7 of the Protection Ordinance was not void under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that no fundamental rights of the petitioners were infringed.

(3.) We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as the respondents. Shri A. S. Chaturvedi appearing on behalf of both the petitioners has attached the orders of the Revenue Board mainly on the ground that Section 7 of the Protection Ordinance was void by virtue of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that there was no reason why the protection of section 7 of the Protection Ordinance should be given only to those tenants who were in occupation of their holdings on the first day of April, 1948 (hereinafter to be referred to as the prescribed date) and were thereafter ejected therefrom or dispossessed thereof or from any part thereof before the commencement of the Protection Ordinance otherwise than by process of law or after the commencement of the Ordinance in contravention of the provisions thereof. It was argued that the protection ought to have applied to all the tenants and not only to such tenants who were in possession of the land on the prescribed date. It was also contended that sub-section 5 of section 7 made another discrimination in as much as it provided that nothing in section 7 would apply to a tenant who had voluntarily given up his holding on the expiry of the term of his lease. It was urged that there was no reason why this proviso, should not apply to those tenants also whose term was not fixed by the lease.