INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, J&K Vs. S NARINDER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE respondent joined service as a Head Constable in the Police Department. In the year 1959 he was appointed as Assistant Traffic Inspector in the Traffic Enforcement Branch of the Police which subsequently came under the control of the Transport Commissioner. Earlier in the year 1956 the respondent underwent fire service training course at National Fire Service College Rampur and sought his absorption in the fire fighting service of the State. On 5 -7 -1964 he was informed by the Government through Transport Commissioner that his case will be considered for appointment in fire service as and when a suitable vacancy arose. Subsequently by Government Order No. Police 50/67 dated 15 -2 -1967 two posts of Dy. Chief Fire Officers in the grade of 300 -600 were created. Under Govt. Order No : Police 92/68 dated 20 -6 -1968 the respondent was ap ­pointed on one of these posts on adhoc basis for a period of six months by the Government presumably acting under Regulation 4 (d) of the Public Service Commission (Limitation of functions) Regulations 1957 which authorises the Government to make appointment to a permanent post of a person temporarily for a period not exceeding six months, pending reference to the Pub ­lic Service Commission where it feels it necessary in the public interest to fill the vacancy immediately. The relevant Govt. order reads.

(2.) THEN followed a formal communication from the Inspector General of Police to the Home Secretary on 12 -11 -1968 in which he placed on record his objections to the order and demanded its cancellation. The matter rested there till a writ petition, out of which the present appeal has arisen, was filed by the res ­pondent on 19 -12 -1968 wherein he prayed for the issue of a writ of Mandamus directing his admission to the post of Dy. Chief Fire Officer in terms of the Govt. order, as aforesaid. According to the reply affidavit filed by the Home Secretary the Govt has since subjected the matter to further scrutiny and decided to cancel the appointment of the respondent and also to refer the matter for selection to the Public Service Com ­mission but no orders could be issued as the matter was sub -judice. The petition was heard by Mr. Justice Bhat and by his order dated 3 -9 -1970 the learned Judge ordered the implementation of the order subject to final selection by the Public Service Commission. Aggrieved by this order the State and the Inspector General of Police have come in appeal under the patent.

(3.) VIEWED on the terms of the Government order No. Police 92/68 dated 20 -4 -1968, sanction was accorded to the appoint ­ment of the respondent as Dy. Chief Fire Officer for a period of six months against a permanent post and not against a post created for a fixed term coinciding with the term of his appoint ­ment. Accordingly he was entitled to hold the post for the full period of six months from the date he assumed charge of the post which could not be so if the post were sanctioned only for a period of six months because then no post could be deemed to have existed against which he could work. To make the point clear suppose a post is created for a period of three months and contemporaneously sanction is accorded to the appointment of a person thereto for the full term, but then it takes all the three months for the order to reach the appointee. In such case the appointee cannot avail of the appointment, not because the time for which he was appointed has run out but because there is no post available now against which he can work. In the same case suppose the order reaches the appointee after a period of one month, he can avail of it for two months not because one month has run out in +he transmission of the order to him but because the post having been sanctioned for a period of three months only beginning from the date of the order there will be no post against which he can work after he has put in two months service. On the other hand let us conceive of a case in which a post is created for a period of one year and yet the appoint ­ment is made for a period of six months only and it takes six months for the order to reach the appointee. In such case the appointee can avail of the appointment for full term of six months because the post would be available for the full period of six months from the date he joins it. The mere fact, therefore, that the period of six months has already elapsed since the order was made in the instant case would not stand in the way of the implementation of the order as long as the post is still available for the full term. Moreover it is the appellants themselves who did not allow the respondent to join the post so far and so they cannot now be heard to say that the period of appointment has already elapsed for the principle is well settled that no one can take advantage of his own wrong. In this view the first point raised by the learned counsel for the appellants must fail.