LAKHAN LAL Vs. CHAIRMAN INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL BIHAR PATNA AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, named 8ri Lakhan Lal, describing himself as the General Secretary, Dalmianagar Mazdur Union, district Shahabad, praying that the award given by the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Patna on the 29th July, 1967, in Reference No. 10 of 1966, holding that an order of suspension in respect of Sri Lakhan Lal, effective from the 20th April, 1965, for two months, passed by opposite party No. 2 was justified, may be quashed.

(2.) Reference had been made to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudicating two issues namely:-

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that Standing Order No. 52 (i) had no application in this case as the notice given by the company to Sri Lakhan Lal asking him not to hold a meeting on this maidan was neither lawful nor legitimate. It is contended that this part of the Standing Order refers to wilful insubordination or disobedience by an employee with reference to his conduct in discharge of his duties as an employee. It is on. tended that Standing Order No. 52 (i) does not apply to a ease where the superiors order does not seek to control any act or omission of an employee in discharge of his duties. It is not possible to accept these contentions. It has been proved that the employer had given notices to Sri Lakhan Lal not to hold meeting on the admitted property of the company and, therefore, the provisions of Standing Order No. 52 (1) were certainly attracted. It is not possible to hold that the employee in question had a right under the law to hold any meeting on the admitted property of his employer, only because the Standing Orders did not prohibit such a meeting, in general, as is contended for. The employer was entitled to give an order to an employee under Standing Order No. 52 (1) not to hold a meeting on the property of the employer, and if there is nothing else, a disobedience of the order would come within the purview of Standing Order No. 52 (i). Secondly, it has been found that Sri Lakhan Lal had defied the watch and ward arrangement. The Presiding Officer has stated that it had been proved that Sri Lakhan Lal and others had pushed away some security officers who had been deputed to stop the meeting being held on the maidan. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended, on this point, that if Sri Lakhan Lal and the union had a right to hold a meeting, then defying of the watch and ward arrangement would not bring the case within the mischief of Standing Order No. 52 (xvii). This contention is also not valid. In the domestic enquiry it had been found that Sri Lakhan Lal had defied the watch and ward arrangement and this conclusion has been accepted by the Industrial Tribunal. It is not possible to hold that this Court can go into the facts and circumstances and re-open the matter. Lastly, Sri Ahmad has contended that Standing Order No. 52 (xv) had not been contravened by Sri Lakhan Lal, as holding a meeting in the maidan was not tantamount to occupying or taking possession of the company's quarters or any of its premises or any portion thereof. Even if this contention is valid, this Court cannot interfere in its writ jurisdiction when the Presiding Officer has also held that Standing Order Nos. 52 (i) and 52 (xvii) had been contravened by the petitioner. I do not find any error of law on the face of the award as would call for issue of any writ or order by this Court for quashing the Award given against the petitioner.