HARINAGAR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED & 4 ORS. Vs. THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the criminal proceeding arising out of Motihari Mufassil P.S. Case No. 133/86 initiated on a first information report dated 9.9.1986. Petitioner No. 1 is a Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. Petitioner nos. 2, 3 and 4 are the Directors of the said Company and petitioner no. 5 is the factory manager thereof. The facts leading to the filing of the present application are as hereinafter stated. The petitioners run a sugar factory. The petitioner Company purchases sugar -cane for the purpose of manufacturing sugar. In the process of manufacturing sugar, it produces by product sugar molasses as well. Molasses are consumed by the distilleries to whom molasses are distributed by the State Government. In terms of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 thereinafter to be referred to as the Act), the Company was forced to take out a licence under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. In terms of the said Act, the Company was required to deposit market fees on transactions of purchase and sale of sugar -cane and sugar. The Company challenged the jurisdiction of the Market committee to realise market fees through a suit in the civil courts. That suit was numbered as Title No. 84 of 1977 in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Bettiah, West Champaran. The suit was for grant of permanent injunction restraining Ramnagar Agricultural Produce Market Committee from realising or taking any step for the realisation of market fees, penalty, interest etc. Three other Companies viz. M.P. Udyog Limited, North Bihar Sugar Mills Limited and New Swadeshi Sugar Mills Limited also filed similar title suits with similar prayer. The suits filed by them were numbered as Title Suit Nos. 78 and 79 of 1977 and 84 of 1978 respectively. The trial Court heard and decreed all the suits by a common judgment and restrained the Market Committees concerned from realising market fees. The Market Committees filed appeal before this Court against each of the plaintiff separately. Appeal against the petitioner Company was numbered as F.A. No. 299 of 1985. Other appeals were numbered as First Appeal Nos. 240 of 1985, 266 of 1985 and 300 of 1985. While the appeals were pending before this Court, an application was filed by Narkatiaganj Market Committee in First Appeal No. 266 of 1985 arising out of Title Suit No. 84 of 1978 for staying operation of the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Bettiah. That application was listed for orders before a single Judge of this Court. The learned Single Judge stayed the operation of order of permanent injunction passed by the Subordinate Judge, Bettiah. While allowing the application of Narkatiaganj Market Committee, the learned Single Judge also stayed operation of the judgment and decree in First Appeal Nos. 240 of 1985, 300 of 1985 and 299 of 1985 arising out of Title Suit No. 78 of 1978, 79 of 1977 and 84 of 1977. I would like to make it absolutely clear that the petition bad been filed only in First Appeal No. 266 of 1985 which was preferred against the judgment and decree passed against Narkatiaganj Agricultural Produce Market Committee in Title Suit No. 84 of 1978 but the order for interim stay was passed by the learned Single Judge in respect of other three First appeals covering three title suits also. The order so far as is relevant reads as follows: - -

(2.) The submission urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the order of the learned Single Judge dated 22.4.1986 was void and non est as First, Appeal No. 299 of 1985 had not been put up before the Bench for consideration in any connection nor were the petitioners heard in that matter. The grievance of the petitioners is that there was not even an application for staying operation of the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 84 of 1977 and therefore, the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to pass any order staying operation of the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge.

(3.) It may be stated here that subsequently First Appeal No. 299 of 1985 was dismissed for non -compliance of a peremptory order of a Bench of this Court passed on 1.7.1986. The criminal case was initiated on 9.9.1986, long after the dismissal of the said first appeal. It is not necessary to emphasise that unless a decree for permanent injunction passed by the Subordinate Judge, Bettiah was set aside, that was final. While that decree was operative, it was no offence to transport sugar Without paying market fees. In that connection, we have to see how for the order of the learned Single Judge was operative.