THE MANAGEMENT OF BALIHARI COLLIERY Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application by the Management of Balihari Colliery of Messrs Balihari Colliery Company (Private) Ltd. under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order given by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, in Application No. 144 of 1967 (Annexure '3'). The facts of the case may be briefly stated. The petitioner, a private limited company is conducting the business of coal raising from its mines and, as such, it owns a coal mine situated in police station Putki in the district of Dhanbad known as the Balihari Colliery. Twenty -four workmen, Kangali Gorai and others, were found by the Company's Medical Officer to be very weak and infirm due to their old age. The Management issued notices on the 26th September, 1967, to the individual workmen concerned to appear for medical examination at Company's cost in the dispensary of the Colliery before the Medical Board constituted for the purpose with the Medical Officer Incharge of the Government Hospital. A copy of the notice is Annexure '2' to the writ application. The workmen concerned did not appear for medical examination. The Management terminated their services, and a copy of the order of termination is Annexure '2' to the writ application. At the relevant time, a dispute between the Management and their workmen regarding the retrenchment of certain workmen was pending before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur. Therefore, the Management filed an application before the said Tribunal under the proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The application was transferred to the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad (respondent no. 1) for disposal.

(2.) The workmen concerned, twenty -four in number, were represented by Sri S.V. Achariar, General Secretary of the Hindusthan Khan Mazdoor Sangh, Hirapur, Dhanbad, and the Management was represented by Sri R.P. Pillai, Secretary, Balihari Colliery. Before the Tribunal, the parties examined their witnesses and filed their documents. The Tribunal held that the workmen were not bound in response to a general letter to appear for medical examination. It further held that supposing they were so bound, there was no evidence at all to prove that a Medical Board was constituted in fact and that none of the workmen concerned appeared before the Medical Board. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the Management merely used this ground as a pretext for getting rid of all of the 24 workmen without a justification or just cause. The Tribunal further found that the relevant provision relating to one month's wages was also not complied with. In view of these findings, the Tribunal refused approval to the discharge of the twenty -four workmen concerned. The Management has consequently moved this Court for quashing the said judgment.

(3.) Mr. Ranen Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that although the Management filed a petition for approval under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act, yet the Tribunal had to decide whether any such application was necessary and the Tribunal ought to have decided this point before going into the merits of the application. The workmen concerned, according to Mr. Roy, were not dismissed or discharged and further they had been noticed not to be dismissed or discharged for any misconduct, but their services were to be terminated simpliciter. He also challenged the findings of the Tribunal as perverse, as they were based on assumptions and generalisations. Reliance was placed by him on a decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V. D.R. Singh ( : A.I.R. 1966 SC 288), wherein it has teen observed that "Where judicial decisions differed on the construction of the words 'workmen concerned in such dispute', it would be idle and unreasonable to suggest that the employer should make up his mind whether Sec. 33 applies or not, and if he thinks that Sec. 33 does not apply, he need not make the application, on the other hand, if he thinks that Sec. 33 applies, he should make an application, but then he cannot be permitted to urge that the application is unnecessary. Such a view is, in our opinion, wholly illogical and unsatisfactory."