(1.) Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that Assistant Librarians employed in the Department of Education challenged office order dated 7.7.1981 whereby only senior most Assistant Librarians were held entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 300-600 from the date shown against each official. Case of Assistant Librarians, in a nutshell, was that they had been discharging same and similar duties, which were being discharged by the senior most Assistant Librarians. Their grievance was not addressed to. They filed CWP No. 246/81, 116/82, 196/81 and 189/79 for redressal of their grievance. These petitions were transferred to the learned Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and registered as TA-543/86, TA-554/86, TA-324/86 and TA-320, respectively. State admitted in the reply filed on 20.4.1982 that the Assistant Librarians of the Colleges/Schools/Public Libraries and Community Centre Libraries comprise a single category and cadre of all the Assistant Librarians was common. The question, which fell for determination before the learned Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, was whether the State was justified in granting the revised pay scale of Rs. 300-600 to only few Assistant Librarians on the basis of seniority when there was only one cadre of Schools/Colleges and other Public Libraries maintained by the Department. Learned Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal allowed these original applications on 26.7.1993. The operative portion of judgment dated 26.7.1993 reads thus:
(2.) In sequel to the judgment rendered by the learned Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, State issued letter dated 16.6.1994. Pay scale of Rs. 300-600 has been released as per letter dated 16.6.1994 only "to the Senior Assistant Librarians of the Department as a measure personal to the existing incumbents". Petitioners are aggrieved by the insertion of this condition.
(3.) Mr. K.D. Shreedhar and Mr- P-P- Chauhan have vehemently argued that the judgment rendered by the learned Tribunal in the aforesaid original applications was "in rem" and not "in personam". In other words, they also contended that the imposition of rider in the notification dated 16.6.1994 is contrary to letter+and spirit of the judgment dated 26.7.1993.