PRABHAT CHANDRA DEKA Vs. K.C. BARUA AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS rule was issued on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate writ quashing the order of the State Government dated 5th December, 1958 and for restraining the operation of the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup dated 22nd December 1958, whereby the Land Acquisition Officer was asked to take steps to realise from the Petitioner the money already paid to him as compensation for acquisition of certain lands belonging to the Petitioner.

(2.) THE facts shortly put are, that the Petitioner Prabhat Chandra Deka was the recorded proprietor and owner of 2 Kathas 13 Lechas of land covered by Kheraj Periodic Patta No. 867 within the Gauhati Municipal area. There is no dispute as to the title of the Petitioner to the land in question but there was some dispute as to the ownership of the houses standing thereon which question, however, is not very material for us to decide. The, Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup requisitioned the land measuring 2 Kathas 13 Lechas belonging to the Petitioner by notification dated 30th August 1956 for the office of the District Transport Office Gauhati under Section 3(1) of the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1948 (or Act XXV of 1948 which we might call 'the Act' hereafter) and notices were served on the Petitioner as well as on his father Abhi Ram Deka, who is Respondent No. 4, and on the tenants living on the land.

(3.) TWO points primarily arise for our consideration on the contentions raised by the parties: first, as to whether there was a competent appeal on the basis of which the impugned order could have been passed and secondly, whether the order of 5 -12 -58 is an order within the jurisdiction or in a excess of the jurisdiction of the State Government. It may not be necessary for us to decide the first point in case we find the second point in favour of the Petitioner. The second contention on behalf of the Petitioner is based on the ground that after the acquisition was completed under Section 4 of the Act, there was no scope for setting aside the act of requisition made under Section 3 of the said Act which expired by operation of law.