(1.) Heard Mr. G.K. Talukdar, learned counsel foe the petitioner. Perused the impungned orders passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner rendered purportedly in exercise of power under section 296 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 "the Act" for short. However, the matter has been detained at that end too long. We would like to impress upon the learned Deputy Commissioner as to the nature, extent or ambit of the power u/s. 296 of "the Act".
(2.) It will be seen on a bare perusal of the amended section 296 of the Act that this extra-ordinary power has been granted to meet extraordinary exigencies or emergent situations. Before entertaining an application u/s. 296 of "the Act" it is essential for the authorities to peruse the order or the resolution of the Board bearing in mind that a Board is an elected body, which has been endowed with statutory powers to perform public duties by the legislature. It is an authority. When an order or resolution passed by the Board militates against the fundamental right conferred by Part III or the State policy on the Directive principles laid down in Part IV of the Constitution or it is in excess of power conferred by law on the Board or if the execution of the resolution or order for the doing of an act directed to be done by Board is likely to lead to a serious breach of the peace or likely to cause serious injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons, the authorities may intervne u/s.296. These are conditions precedents to exercise powers u/s.296. Therefore, before entertaining an application u/s.296 of "the Act" it is essential for the authority to reach a tentative finding that the complaint made against the decision or order or resolution of the Board suffer from constitutional infirmities and/or are likely to lead to serious breach of the peace or are likely to cause serious injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons.
(3.) In the complaints there is no allegation of any breach of peace or likelihood of serious injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons nor is there any inkling that the settlement order was violative of any of the constitutional provisions, not to speak of Part III and/or Part IV of the Constitution. It is stated that the complaints were against the order of settlement in favour of the highest bidder. Surely, the settling authority is neither, the Govt. nor the officers set forth in Sec. 296 of "the Act". The statutory authority to make the settlement is undoubtedly "the Board". It appears that in the instant case the applications were filed to the State Govt. but the Govt. instead of disposing the matter itself, transmitted the applications to the learned Deputy Commissioner.