DHATU RAM DAS Vs. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS rule arises out of an application under Article 226of the Constitution praying for a writ or certiorari quashing the order passed by the (sic)ndar Munsiff of Gauhati dated the 16th January 1961 and the order passed by the District Judge, Gauhati on the 11th April 1961 affirming the order of the Munsiff.

(2.) THE proceedings which led up to the present petition arose out of an election for the presidentship of the Abhoypur Gaon Panchayat The election was held on the 13th June 1960. The Petitioner Dhatu Ram Das and opposite party No. 2 Lalit Chandra Das were the two rival candidates for the presidentship of the aforesaid Gaon Panchayat. The Petitioner was duly elected as the President and the results were duly declared under Rules 21 and 22 of the Assam Panchayats (Constitution) Rules 1960 (hereinafter called the Rules'). The opposite party No. 2 filed on the 20th July 1960 a petition under Rule 25 of the rules challenging the validity of the election of the Petitioner before the Munsiff. Rule 25 of the Rules provides that a petition is to be made before the Munsiff challenging the validity of the election within a period of thirty days from the date on which the election was held. The election was held on the 13th June 1960 as I have already indicated above. The petition therefore on the plain reading of Rule 25 had to be filed within thirty days from the 13th June 1960. The petition was thus admittedly filed beyond the period prescribed under Rule 25.

(3.) THE contention of the opposite party is that the word 'appeal' in Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act has been liberally interpreted in various decisions of various High Courts. The word 'appeal' should not be given a restricted meaning so as to confine it to the power exercised by the courts under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure when hearing an appeal against the decree of the subordinate courts. The word 'appeal' should be given a wider connotation and if such an interpretation is given to the word 'appeal', the proceeding initiated on an application under Rule 25 will be covered by the word 'appeal'. We do not think that there is any substance in this contention. It is true that the word 'appeal' need not be given a restricted meaning in Section 12(2). It will have to be seen having regard to the relief which the authority grants and having regard to the procedure which it follows in determining the rights of the parties, whether it can be said that the authority is exercising appellate power or is examining the order passed by a subordinate court in the exercise of its appellate power in order to attract the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act.