Chakravartti, C.J. - (1.)By three separate orders marie in three different cases under Rule 1(ii) Chapter II of the Appellate Side Rules, a Division Bench has referred practically the same question of law for decision by a larger Bench. The question concerns the effect of the repeal of the West, Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act. 1950 by Act XII of 1956 on proceedings pending on the date of the repeal. The repealed Art was a temporary Act, due to expire on the 31st March, 1956 and it was repealed on that very date. One of the cases out of which the references have arisen is a second appeal, one is an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and one is a re vision under Section 32(4) of the repealed Act.
(2.)In the second appeal, S. A. No. 842 of 1954, the facts are that six persons who were the co-owners of a house brought a suit for the ejectment of the tenant occupying it on the ground that they required the house for their own occupation and had terminated the tenancy by a notice to quit. Subsequently, the sixth plain tiff was transferred to the category of defendants. The trial court found that the requirement of the plaintiffs had been established and decreed the suit. On an appeal by the tenant the appellate court held that three of the plaintiffs did not re quire the house for their own occupation and therefore the suit must fail, because, in the Court's view, where there were more landlords- than one, Proviso (h) to Section 12(1) of the Act of 1950 contem plated that the requirement must be the require ment of all of them. The landlords then prefer red the present second appeal to this Court which came up for hearing before P. N, Mookerjee, J., but was referred by him to a Division Bench. It next came up for hearing before a Division Bench, constituted of Das Gupta and Guha, JJ., on the 21st of May, 1956. By that time, the Act of 1950 had already been repealed.
(3.)In the Letters Patent Appeal, No. 1 of 1956, the facts are that the owner of a house served on the tenant on the ground floor a notice to quit and then sued him in ejectment on the allegation that she required the ground floor for her own use and occupation and further that the tenant had been a defaulter. The plaintiff's case of her personal requirement was negatived by both the trial court and the first appellate court. The trial court hold further that the tenant had not been a defaulter within the meaning of the proviso to Section 14(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, because no defaults of the required nature and number had occurred within the period of 18 months immediately preceding the institution of the suit and also that the plaintiff's suit was bound to fail in any event, since the had waived the benefit of her notice to quit by subsequent acceptances of rent. The suit was accordingly dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff, that deci-sion was reversed and the suit decreed by the first appellate court which held that there had been no waiver of the benefit of the notice to quit and further that the tenant had been a defaulter within the meaning of the proviso to Section 14 (3) which did not require that the defaults contemplated by it should occur within the 18 months immediately preceding the suit. There was a second appeal by the tenant which came to be heard by P. N. Mookerjee, J. The learned Judge upheld the view of the lower appellate court on both the points and dismissed the appeal, but he gave leave to the tenant for a further appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent Appeal came up for hearing before Das Gupta and Guha, JJ., on the 22nd May, 1956, but before that date, the Act of 1950 had been repealed.