(1.) The petitioner was accused of raising unauthorized construction in deviation of the building plan, sanctioned by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (hereafter the Corporation), thereby violating its building rules. The Special Officer (Building), the opposite party no.3, passed an order of demolition of such unauthorized construction (vide order dated April 7, 1987). The petitioner carried the order in appeal before the Municipal Building Tribunal (hereafter the tribunal). The tribunal by its order dated January 6, 2000 dismissed the appeal. It was recorded in the appellate order that the petitioner had admitted raising of unauthorized construction and had prayed for retention thereof. Not having found any infirmity in the order under challenge, the tribunal while upholding it directed the petitioner to comply therewith and demolish the unauthorized construction within 30 days failing which the Corporation would be at liberty to demolish the same at the petitioner s risk and costs.
(2.) On April 25, 2000, the petitioner applied for review of the order dated January 6, 2000 under Rule 19(5) read with Rule 24 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Tribunal (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1965 (hereafter the Rules) read with Order 47 Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. The point that was sought to be raised by the petitioner in review was that the Special Officer lacked the authority to order demolition since he had not been delegated such power by the Municipal Commissioner, being the opposite party no.2; what was delegated, according to her, was the power of hearing the person responsible.
(3.) In support of such a contention, the petitioner placed before the tribunal an order dated June 28, 1991 of the self-same tribunal. It was held therein that Circular No. 9 of 1985-86 dated July 3, 1985 issued by the City Architect, notifying order dated July 3, 1985 of the Municipal Commissioner, delegated only the power to the Special Officer to hear the person responsible and the complainant in respect of alleged unauthorized construction and that the order of the Special Officer could only be considered as a tentative order recommending demolition but could not by itself be treated as an order of demolition authorizing the Corporation to proceed in that respect. It was claimed by the petitioner that the said order dated June 28, 1991 of the tribunal could be traced out after vigorous search subsequent to dismissal of her appeal by the tribunal and that since she had been able to discover new material which would have a bearing on the outcome of the appeal filed by her, the tribunal ought to review its order dated January 6, 2000 and reconsider her appeal.