KAMAL NARAIN SHARMA Vs. DWARKA PRASAD MISHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act), has arisen from an election petition filed by the appellant for a declaration that the election of Shri Dwarka Prasad Mishra (hereinafter called the "respondent") to the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly from Kasdol Assembly constituency in the bye-election held in May 1963, is void.

(2.) THE appellant first contends that the trial of the petition was abruptly closed by the Tribunal and he was denied reasonable opportunity to fully cross-examine the respondent. Secondly, his applications for leave to amend the petition were wrongly rejected by the Tribunal. Thirdly, admission of certain documentary evidence was wrongly refused by the Tribunal. Before we proceed to decide these preliminary points, we must consider the preliminary objections raised for the respondent; first, the appeal must be dismissed as barred by time ; and second, the appeal has become infructuous.

(3.) SHRI Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondent, contends that neither section 12 (2) nor section 4 of the Limitation Act has any application to an appeal under section 116-A of the Act. This question will have to be examined in the light of the provisions contained in section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It reads thus:- Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." The applicability of this section to an appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act was examined from different angles, and a variety of arguments were considered by their Lordships in Vidyacharan Shukla V. Khubchand Baghel(AIR 1964 S0 1099=1964 6 SCR 129). Although to that case the Limitation Act of 1908 was applicable yet, as there is no difference between section 29 (2) of the 1908 Act and section 29 (2) of the 1963 Act, so far as the application of section 12 is concerned, that case is authority where there is the question of applicability of section 12 of the 1963 Act read with section 29 (2) of that Act. Their Lordships held that by virtue of section 29 (2) the provisions of section 12 of that Act apply to any appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of People Act. That high and binding authority clinches the issue. For the same reasons it must be held that section 4 of the Limitation Act is also attracted with the aid of section 29 (2) of that Act.