BALVEERSINGH Vs. KISHANLAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A Single Bench of this Court, while dealing with Second Appeal No. 35/86, feet difficulty, in view of some conflicting decisions of this Court, in deciding the question as to whether mere disclaimer of the landlord's title by the tenant entitles the landlord to a decree for his eviction in terms of S.12(1)(c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, without proving further that such disclaimer affects the plaintiff's interest adversely and substantially. Therefore, he moved the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for deciding the question. Thus, the said question came to be referred to this Division Bench.

(2.) The question, as framed, is purely that of law. It presupposes that estoppel under S.116 and there is also 'disclaimer' by him prior to the date of institution of the suit. We say so because there may be a case where, in certain set of circumstances, the estoppel under S.116 of the Evidence Act may not be operative, entitling the tenant to challenge the plaintiff's title and his averments may not amount to 'disclaimer'. The terms 'disclaimer' has not been defined either in the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, or in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In order to appreciate the import of that term, a reference to S.111(g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary because the term has been in use since long to describe that provision in short. Under that provision, a lease of immovable property determines in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. Thus, in the context, the term 'disclaimer' has to be understood to mean renunciation by the tenant of his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. So, a 'disclaimer' necessarily jeopardises the landlord's title; and, when the landlord's title itself is so jeopardised, the 'disclaimer' necessarily has the tendency to constitute an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest in the accommodation. That constitutes a ground for eviction under S.12(1)(c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. That Section was analysed by A.P. Sen, J. (as he then was) in the case of Ghulam Mohammad v. Poonam Chand, 1969 MPLJ 843 in the following words.

(3.) The question again came up before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pandit Ramjilal Tiwari v. Vijai Kumar, 1970 MPLJ 50 : (1970 Cri LJ 1176). In that case, the Division Bench observed - "It is hardly necessary to add that disclaimer of title by the tenant is a ground for eviction included in Cl.(c) of S.12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act Accommodation Control, 1961". The view taken by Single Bench in the case of Ghulam Mohammad (1969 MPLJ 843) (supra) was, thus, affirmed by the Division Bench. Both the said decisions were considered by G.P. Singh, J. (as he then was) in the case of Nebraj v. Amrit Kaur (1973 Jab LJ 445). Referring to the observation "a denial of the landlord's title undoubtedly affects him adversely and it also affects him substantially" made in Ghulam Mohammad's case (supra), his Lordship observed in para. 4. "But by reading the case as a whole I do not think that the learned Judge meant to hold that every denial of landlord's title is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. Take a case where a tenant denies the title of the landlord under a mistake and soon thereafter having discovered his mistake intimates the landlord that his earlier denial of the title was under a mistake and that he accepts him as his landlord. Take another case where the tenant bona fide, to protect his interest, refuses to recognise any one of the rival heirs of the original landlord as his landlord until their rival claims are settled or decided. I do not think that in the examples that I have given it would be possible to say that the denial of title is such which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. The true legal position appears to be that in every case it will have to be seen whether in the particular facts of that case denial of title by the tenant is such that it is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord". The two examples mentioned in the case Nebraj (supra) are, in our opinion, not those of "disclaimer", the meaning of which has already been explained by us above. So far as the first example is concerned, suffice it to say that the averment made under mistake could be withdrawn. As regards the second example, the tenant's averment did not amount to 'disclaimer' at all. In the same case, the learned Judge found it as a fact that there was complete denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant. Having arrived at that finding of fact constituting 'disclaimer', his Lordship held in para. 7 that, in the circumstances of that case, setting up a title in a third person who comes forward and claims the house adversely to the plaintiff and that the denial of the plaintiff's title adversely and substantially affects the plaintiffs interest. The observations made by his Lordship in para. 7 of the judgement are noteworthy. "It has to be noted that the words used in S.12(1)(c) are "is likely to affect and not "it has affected". Therefore, it is not necessary to be established that the act of denial of title really adversely and substantially affected the interest of the landlord and it is sufficient for the landlord to establish that the act was such that it was likely to affect him adversely and substantially. In the instant case, the defendant completely repudiated the contract of tenancy with the plaintiff and her predecessor. Further, by setting up a title in a third person without any reason whatsoever, and by further setting up an agreement for sale of the house in his favour through that third person, the defendant gave out clearly to the plaintiff that he was not going to fulfil his part under the contract of tenancy. It is not disputed that no rent was at all paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. Setting up a title in a third person was also a sort of invitation to the third person to come forward and claim the house adversely to the plaintiff. The denial of the plaintiff's title, in the circumstances of the case did in fact adversely and substantially affect the plaintiff's interest and she was left with no option but to file the suit for eviction. The ground under S.12(1)(c) was therefore, clearly made out." Thus, .....in other words, his Lordship also approved the view that renunciation by the tenant of his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, he does an act which affects adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord in the accommodation and that is sufficient to entitle the landlord to claim eviction under S.12(1)(c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.