LAWS(MPH)-1963-9-6

HARGOVIND MADANLAL SHARMA Vs. DIVISIONAL ENGINEER SOUTH EASTERN RLY BILASPUR

Decided On September 29, 1963
HARGOVIND MADANLAL SHARMA Appellant
V/S
DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, SOUTH EASTERN RLY., BLLASPUR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) - The applicant has filed this revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the order, dated 20-3-1963, of ejectment of the appellant-applicant from the suit premises which was initially passed by the Estate Officer, South Eastern Railway, Bilaspur, and which was, on appeal confirmed by the District Judge, Raigarh, be set aside, and the Estate Officer be directed to proceed with the ease according to law.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the facts are that the applicant Hargovind Sharma who carries on his business under the name and style of 'Ramavtar Hargovind Sharma' was given a tea stall contract at Kharasiar railway station, from 1-1-1961 for a term of three years. On account of extension of the railway plat- form, the land on which the tea stall originally was to be located could not be given to the applicant and he was given some other land behind the railway station. He was put in occupation of that land under the orders of the Assistant Engineer, South Eastern Railway, Raigarh, dated 6-3-1962. It is urged on behalf of the applicant that thereafter, only the formality of preparing a written agreement of lease was to be gone through. The applicant constructed some structure over the land. According to him, it was a valuable construction costing him about Rs. 5,000. However, the District Engineer, subsequently refused to accord his consent to this grant of lease to the applicant and an order was passed on 31-12-1962 requiring him to show cause by 28-1-1963 as to why he should not be evicted from the said premises, his occupation being held to be unauthorised. On 4-2-1963, actually the Estate Officer in pursuance of the said show cause notice purported to determine his lease of the said premises.

(3.) HAVING heard both the learned counsel, I am of the view that the preliminary objection is well founded. Section 10 of the Act provides that "save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by an estate officer or appellate officer under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding." Under section 9, subsection (1), an appeal shall lie from every order of the estate officer made in respect of any public premises under section 5 or section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years' standing as the District Judge may designate in this behalf. It is clear from the language of the above mentioned provisions that an appeal lies to the District Judge as a persona designata and not to a Court of the District Judge. This means that the decision of the District Judge does not give rise to a revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The language used in section 10 of the Act provides a very wide prohibition by enacting that the order of the appellate officer shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. The word "application" is wide enough, in my opinion, to covor an application made under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.