(1.) The firm of Lal Brothers through a Railway Receipt dated 10-10-1953 despatched from Aligarh two cases of locks with keys to Muhammad Jamaluddin and brothers. The consignment) reached Secunderabad, on 9-11-1953. The consignee, however, received the Railway Receipt on 24-12-1953. On the succeeding day, the carting agent of the consignee, P. W. 2 approached the clerk concerned to take delivery of the consignment but was called upon to pay the freight and wharfage charges due on that date. He, however, was asked to come next day. On that date he was told that no delivery could be effected since the consignments were missing. On 28-12-1953 the consignee, petitioner herein, addressed a notice to the Claims Superintendent demanding Rs. 333-3-0 as damages for the loss of .the locks. The Claims Superintendent through his letter dated 30-1-1954 disowned every liability by replying- "My inquiries reveal that the above consignment was received at Secunderabad en 9-11-1953 and was available since then. However, you turned up and took delivery only 25-12-53 and not removed them the same day, and the cases were found missing on 26-12-53."The petitioner in his reply of 12-2-1954 protested stating that after the freight and wharfage charges were realised, the agent was asked to come on 26-12-53 and was then told that the goods were missing. He, therefore, asserted that no fault could be laid at his door. This time the Claims Superintendent refused to comply with the request on the ground that- "The time allowed for delivery free of wharfage expired on 10-11-53 and the cases were found missing after the expiry of free time allowed when it was lying in the goods shed awaiting delivery. You, however, turned up for delivery on 25-12-53, after the expiry of the time allowed free of wharfage. As per Rule 30 (2) of I. R. C. A. Goods Tariff No. 28 which is reproduced below, I have to state that railway administration is not responsible for the alleged loss which took place after the expiry of the time allowed free of wharfage."The petitioner by his reply dated 12-2-1954 pointed out the discrepancy in the statement of facts contained in both the replies given by the Claims Superintendent and protested against the shifting of ground. Having despaired of getting compensation for the admitted loss of goods he instituted the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Secunderabad. The respondent did not plead what the Claims Superintendent has stated in his reply dated 30/01/1954, but relying on Rule 30 (2) of I. R. C. A. Goods Tariff No. 28 asserted that the railway administration was not responsible for the loss inasmuch as the delivery was not taken by the petitioner within the period prescribed by the rule.
(2.) The learned Subordinate Judge gave effect to the plea and dismissed the suit, by his judgment and decree dated 17-1-1956. It is against this decision that the plaintiff petitioner has filed the instant revision petition.
(3.) Now Rule 30 (2) reads as follows: "The Railway Administration hereby give public notice that in respect of goods/articles not removed from Railway premises at station or destination within the time allowed free of demurrage and wharfage the Railway is not liable in any respect for any loss, destruction, deterioration of or damage in such goods/articles arising from whatever cause notwithstanding that the Railway shall be entitled to be paid the authorised charges for goods/ articles so left on their premises." The learned advocate for the petitioner argued that the above rule was ultra vires the rule-making power conferred by Section 47 (f) of the Railways Act. In support of that contention he relied on governor-general in Council v. Jagan Nath, AIR 1943 Lah 244 (A). Dhawan J., who decided the case, held that such a rule was inconsistent with the Railways Act and contravened the legal liability of the Railway. The learned advocate for the respondent on the other hand placed reliance on Vidya Sagar v. governor-general in Council, AIR 1949 Lah 166 (B), where the plaintiffs had allowed a period of six weeks to elapse after the arrival of goods before they asked for delivery thereof and they were lost. Achhru Ram I., did not decide the question whether the view of Dhawan J., was correct but following Bengal & North-Western Rly. v. Mulchand, ILR 42 All 655: (AIR 1920 All 280) (C) and Secy. of State v. Harikishen Das Kura Mal, ILR 7 Lah 370: (AIR 1926 Lah 575 (2) ) (D), held that independently altogether of the provisions of Rule 28 (2), the Rail- way Administrations liability remained in force only for the period during which the goods remained in transit and for a reasonable period after their arrival at the destination and that after the expiry of suck reasonable time there was no legal obligation imposed on the Railway Administration to look after the goods or account for them.