LAWS(APH)-1961-7-25

P M DESHPANDE Vs. FERRO ALLOYS CORPORATION AND R B SREE RAM AND CO PRIVATE LIMITED SRIKAKULAM

Decided On July 24, 1961
P.M.DESHPANDE Appellant
V/S
FERRO ALLOYS CORPORATION AND R.B. SREE RAM AND CO. PRIVATE LTD., SRIKAKULAM Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners have been convicted by the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad Cum-Special First Class Magistrate Hyderabad, for contravention of the provisions of Sections 27 and 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and sentenced to imprisonment and also to fine. On appeal, the Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, giving benefit of doubt to accused-1 acquitted him of an offence under Section 29 and upheld the conviction of A.2 under that Section and of both the accused on the other count, but maintained only the sentence of fine awarded to the accused. The petitioners have, therefore, come up to this Court invoking its revisionary powers. Petitioner No. 1 P. M. Deshpande is the Executive Member of the FACOR and Sree R. B. Sreeram Workers Union and the 2nd petitioner is the President of the said Union. There was a strike from 24-9-1960 to 1-10-1960 of the FACOR and R. B. Sree Ram and Company (Private) Ltd. The case of the prosecution is that there was a settlement during the course of the conciliation on 30-9-1959 to which the FACOR and R. B. Sree Ram and Company Workers Union and also the management were parties and thereunder the Union had agreed not to resort to any strike or to any direct action in future and agreed that disputes, if any, which might arise in future would be settled by negotiation and conciliation. It was further agreed that the Union would maintain industrial peace for a period of three years from the date and would not raise any demands including increase in wages, in any form and in dearness allowance etc., for the said period commencing from 30-9-1959. This settlement was duly signed by the parties and also the Labour Conciliation Officer. A report was sent to the appropriate Government along with the memo of agreement signed by the parties. The prosecution contends that the terms of this agreement were fully acted upon by the Management, but the Union and the Workers could not be as good as their word, and that at the instigation of the accused, a strike was staged in breach of the settlement making fresh demands. Thus it is said that the accused petitioners herein, incurred the penalties under Sections 27 and 29 of the Act. The action was initiated at the instance of the Management, who after obtaining the requisite authorities from the Government lodged their complaint with the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal, who happens to be appointed Special Magistrate under Notification G. O. Ms. No. 1517 dated 4-7-1959 with all the powers of a First Class Magistrate for the purposes of trying offences under the Labour enactments in the entire State of Andhra Pradesh. The accused took up several picas challenging the propriety of the sanction given and also the legality of the action taken against them. All their pleas were rejected. The appellate Court agreed with the findings of the learned Chairman on-all the above points. The same points which have been unsuccessfully urged before the Court below have been reiterated in this revision petition.

(2.) The first point urged relates to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to take cognizance of the matter. It was argued that there was no proper vesting of authority in the Tribunal as contemplated by Section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code, because the powers conferred under the notification were not on a particular person by name, nor for a particular area in any of the Districts. This contention, having regard to the provisions of Sections 14 and 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is devoid of merit. Before I consider the above provisions of law, it may be necessary to refer the wording of the Notification which had conferred powers on the Tribunal. It reads thus:-

(3.) The second point relates to the question whether the proceedings against the accused were properly initiated. Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act in this behalf provides thus:- "(1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or of the abatement of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government." The proceedings purport to be initiated under the authority of the appropriate Government on a complaint filed by the Management. The authority was given in the following words:-