(1.) The issue before the Full Bench is whether a writ petition lies against a Co-operative Society, and if it does, in what circumstances? Context is the enforcement of bye-laws governing service conditions of employees.
(2.) In P.S.Naidu v. Chittoor District Co-operative Central Bank, (1977) 2 APLJ (HC) 282: (1978 Lab IC 528), a Division Bench of this Court held that an order of punishment made by a Society against its employee cannot be questioned by the latter by way of writ petition. The Bench pointed out "as far as this Court is concerned, it has uniformly taken the view that a writ petition does not lie against a co-operative society especially when it relates to matters concerning the Society and its employees. In C. V. Narasimha Naidu v. Chittoor District Co-operative Bank Ltd., (1971) 2 APLJ (SN)16 ("W.P. No. 3788/1970 dated 7-6-1971 "), one of us (Kuppuswami, J.) following the decision of a Division Bench of this (Madras?) Court in Lakshmaiah v. Sri Perumbadur T.C.M. Society, AIR 1962 Mad 169, held that an order under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be issued to quash the proceedings of a co-operative society .... The Bench noted that there appears to be a difference of opinion between the various High Courts in the country on that question, and observed "we would however prefer to rest our decision on the ground that what the petitioner is seeking to ensure is a purely contractual right, and in substance his case is that there has been a wrongful interference with his conditions of service by the stoppage of three increments. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Kulchindar Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, AIR 1976 SC 2216, where a petitioner is seeking to enforce a contract, he cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 by-passing the normal channels of civil litigation. Even in W.P. No. 3788 of 1970 dated 7-6-1971 : (reported in (1971) 2 APLJ (SN) 16), another ground for dismissing the writ petition was that in terminating the services of its own employees, the Cooperative Society cannot be said to be acting in the discharge of a public duty. In considering whether a particular body is an institution amenable to jurisdiction under Art.226, it was observed that it is to be ascertained whether the particular act complained of is one which was done in, discharge of a public duty. A statutory body entrusted generally with the performance of a public duty may still perform several acts which cannot be considered to be public functions like entering into a contract for the purchase of goods or other property. While doing so, it is not discharging a public function. Similarly it was held that termination of services is one connected only with the contract of employment. A fortiori in this case, the stoppage of increments cannot be regarded to be a public function, but is only one connected with the contract.."
(3.) Similar view was taken by a learned single Judge in Ranga Reddy v. Co-operative Electricity Supply Society Ltd., 1977 Andh LT 172.