KHADERNAWASKHANPET LABOUR CONTRACT COOPERATIVE SOCIETY MULAPET NELLORE Vs. COLLECTOR CO OP NELLORE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this writ petition, the petitioner viz., Khadernawazkhanpet Labour Contract Co-operative Society, Mulpet, Nellore represented by its President, challenges the proceedings of the Special Category Deputy Registrar-cum-Personal Assistant to the Collector (Co-operation), Nellore dated 25-1-1978 in R C No. 123/78-B in and by which he authorised himself to hold and enquiry into the affairs of the Society under section 51 of the A P. Co-operative Societies Act VII of 1964. The said order reads as follows:-

(2.) The main contention ot Sri V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the proposed enquiry is sought to be initiated on the representation of the Vice President and ex-member of the Society and that the Deputy Registrar has no jurisdiction to act upon such representation and hold an enquiry under Section 51 of the Act. Section 51 of the Act reads as follows. -

(3.) Sri V.Venkataramanaiah has fairly brought to my notice a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Motor Workers Union Vs. R. Apparao (1), 1970-I An.W.R. 161 in which a question arose whether a suo motu revision could be entertained by the Government under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act when the revision petition filed by a party is found to be out of time. In that case the Regional Transport Authority passed an order of transfer of a stage carriage. The aggrieved party who objected to the transfer filed a revision petition before the Government of Andhra Pradesh under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government set aside that order and remanded the case to the Regional Transport Authority for fresh disposal. This order of remand was challenged in a writ petition, which was allowed and the matter remitted back to the Government for disposal afresh after hearing the parties concerned. The Government passed an order setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and remitted the matter back to the Regional Transport Authority. This order of the Government was once again challenged by way of a writ petition in this Court. The writ petition was allowed and the order of the Government was quashed on the ground that the Government had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition as it was time-barred. The contention put forward before the learned single judge that the Government must be deemed to have taken suo motu action under Section 64-A of the Act was rejected on the ground that the Government took action on the revision petition filed by the 3rd respondent therein and that the Government did not take action suo motu under Section 64-A of that Act. That view was challenged in Writ Appeal which came up before A. Sambasiva Rao, J., (as he then was) and A. Kuppuswami. J. It was contended before the Bench that under Section 64-A- power is conferred on the State Government to call for the records of any order passed by any authority or officer subordinate to it either on its own motion or on an application made to it and that simply because an application was made before it by an aggrieved party the Government did not cease to have the suo motu power to call for the records and examine the same. It was contended for the respondents before the Division Bench that once an aggrieved party files a revision petition the Government lost all power to act suo motu. The learned Judges repelled that contention. The learned Judges found that Rule 195 (1) of the Motor Vehicle Rules prescribed the period of limitation of 30 days with regard to the filing of a rivision petition by an aggrieved party before the Government under section 64-A but no period of limitation was prescribed for exercising the revisional power suo motu. It was found on the facts of that cise that the revision petition filed by the aggrieved party was beyond the period of 30 days prescribed by Rule 195 (1). The question then arose, whether the Government was precluded from exercising the suo motu power by reason of the revision petition filed by the aggrieved party being barred by limitation. The lea ned Judges answered the said question in the negative and observed as follows:- "We have no doubt, that question is capable of only one answer and that is, that the Government still continued to have the power of acting suo motu. The language of the section does not lend any support to the contention of the respondent It is impossible to construe the section as laying down that, if an application by an aggrieved party is made to it, the Government cannot exercise its Suo Motu power, but should only adjudicate on the application one way or the other. Neither the section nor any Rules made under the Act prescribed the manner in which an order or proceedings of any authority or officer subordinate to the Government can be brought to its notice, so that it may of its own motion call for the records and examine them. It may come to know of an order by the lower authority or officer by way of such authority or officer sending it a copy of such order of proceedings Or, it may come to know of a proceeding while it is examining some other connected matter. It is equally possible for the Government to come to know of an order of proceeding when the aggrieved party itself files a petition before it. Since the knowledge of the Government of any order or proceedings may arise at any time, it was thought necessary and desirable by the Rule making authority that no period of limitation should be prescribed for the exercise of suo motu power by the Government. We fail to see anything either in section 64-A or in Rule 195, which prevents the Government from taking suo motu action, when it comes to know of a defective order of proceedings of a lower authority though a petition filed by an aggrieved party though it is not maintainable on account of bar of limitation or is otherwise irregular, obviously the main intention of the Legislature is to confer on the Government power to correct orders and proceedings of the lower authorities and officers. The power is conferred on the Government and for the exercise of that power no limitation is prescribed. What rule 195(1) imposes is only a limit on the aggrieved parties right to file a petition. It does not in any way interfere with or restrict the power of the Government to correct an incorrect order of a lower authority. If the petition filed by the aggrieved party is not maintainable for any reason, it could only mean that there is no application made to the Government. Such a situation cannot be worse than there being no application at all. It is admitted and indeed there cannot be any dispute that if there is no application at all and if the Government comes to know of an incorrect order at any time it can call for the records and correct it. The filing of an unmaintainable application by an aggrieved party cannot alter the situation and take away the power of the Government to act Suo Motu. After all, the application which is irregular and not maintainable for some reason or other could be a source of knowledge for the Government of the incorrect order. Once it comes to know of an order, either through the application of an aggrieved party or in some other way, the Government can exercise its power Suo Moto. It should also be noted that Section 64-A uses the word 'or' between 'of its own motion' and 'on application made to it' which shows that the Government can act in either case and set right the order or proceeding. If the latter method is not avallable, the first one is certainly open to the Government. The use of the word 'or' certainly imports into the section the meaning 'that the Government's power to correct orders' covers each of the two contingencies, viz,, 'acting on its own motion' or 'on application made to it by an aggrieved person'. To argue that the existence of one contingency excludes the other is clearly violating the meaning and intention of the section. We can also test the same in another way. Suppose within 30 days, the Government of its own moticn called for the records and found that there was no error in the order of the lower authority Would it prevent the aggrieved party from presenting an application within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. We do not think it would. It can as well happen that after re-examination of the records with the aid of the aggrieved party's representation, the Government may detect some error which should be rectified. Even then the Government will continue to have the power to correct such an order. It is thus clear that one method does not exclude the other. In this context, the absence of any period of limitation for such exercise of Suo Moto power by the Government is very significant and revealing. That should necessarily mean that even if the right of an aggrieved party to file an application before it is time-barred, the Government can nonetheless, proceed in the matter Suo Motu. We cannot therefore, accede to the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that once an aggrieved party files an application, the Government losses all power to act Suo Motu On a reading of section 64 A and Rule 195 (1) we have no hesitation to hold that even if an application is filed before the Government which is not maintainable on account of bar of limitation or for some other reason, the Government nevertheless continues to have the power to act Suo Motu". The principle laid down in the aforesaid decision fully applies to the exercise of suo motu power by the Registrar under Section 51 of the Act.