(1.) The petitioner is appointed as Steno-typist on 24th January, 1978 in the Munsif Magistrate Court, Yellareddy. He is oustedon 15-11-1979 from that post by the District and Sessions Judge, Nizamabad, who is the appointing authority. The petitioner complains in this Writ petition against an order of ouster passed against him. Firstly he contends that his appointment on 24th January, 1978 is a regular appointment and against a clear vacancy. Secondly it is contended that in view of G 0. Ms. No. 646. General Administration (Services-A) Department, dated 14 9-1979 his services, even on the assumption that he is a temporary hand should have been regularised. Finally, it is argued that retention of one B J. Raju, who is his junior having been appointed as Steno-typist on 26-2-1978, while the petitioner has been ousted, vitiates the order of his ouster.
(2.) The first and second contentions of the petitioner do not raise serious question for consideration. The District and Sessions Judge, Nizamabad in his counter-affidavit clearly states that the petitioner is appointed only against a temporary vacancy and not against a clear vacancy. The District and Sessions Judge justifies the order of ouster passed by him agains the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner having been appointed as a temporary L.D.Steno in a temporary post, with the abolition of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Nizambad, on the 30th April, 1979 and the Additional Munsif Magistrate's Court of that place on 15th November, 1979 has to be retrenched. I do not find the petitioner disputing these facts in his reply regarding the nature of the post to which he is appointed I, therefore, proceed on the basis that the post to which the petitioner is appointed is also temporary,
(3.) The crux of the matter then is whether the petitioner who has been temporarily appointed in a temporary post created by the necessity of erection of a new and temporary establishment has any cause of complaint against the orders of retrenchment passed on the abolition of that temporary establishment. Clearly it would not be possible tor the respondent to continue the petitioner now as a L.O.Steno after the abolition of the temporary post. It has now been well settled by the Supreme Court that the Government has a right to abolish a post in Government service in the interests and necessity of Public Administration and that on the abolition of such a post the holder thereof should go without any right to complain. That the abolition of such a post does not Infringe the rights of the holder of that post under Article 311 of the Constitution is decided by the Supreme Court in M.Ramanath Pillai V. The State of Kerala and another (1) 1974 (1) S.C.R. page 515 and State of Haryana V. Des Raj (2) 1976 (2) S.C.R. page 1034. The principle of those cases is that abolition of a post by the State comes under the pleasure doctrine under. Article 310 of the Constitution and does not come under the exception created to that pleasure doctrine in favour of the employee under Article 311. In the words of State of Harayana V. Des Raj (No. 2 supra), "whether a post should be retained or abolished is essentially a matter for the Government to decide, and as long as the decision is taken in good faith, it could not be set aside by the Court.........The termination of a post in good faith and the consequent termination of the services of the incumbent of that post would not attract Article 311". If that were to be so in the case of a regular employee holding a permanent post, afortiori, it must be the same in the case of a temporary employee holding a temporary post A temporary incumbent of a temporary post certainly cannot have higher rights than a regular employee holding a permanent post. On my finding that the petitioner Is merely holding a temporary post in a temporary capacity, it follows that the order of ouster passed by the respondent District Judge on the abolition of the temporay post suffers from no infirmity.