M GOPAIAH Vs. MALLESWARA SWAMI LABOUR CONTRACT CO OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two writ appeals are directed against the order of our learned brother P.A. Choudary, J. directing the District Munsif, Guntur -

(2.) Though we admitted the writ appeal, we ourselves were doubtful whether a writ appeal lies against such an order. Appeals against judgments rendered in writ petitions by a single Judge of this Court are filed and entertained under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. What constitutes a judgment has been the subject-matter of several decisions. In Asrumati Devi v. Rupendra Deb Raikot, 1953 SCJ 300 : (AIR 1953 SC 198), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question as to what are the tests to determine whether a particular order made by a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent, Calcutta constituted a judgment under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent for the purpose of the appeal. Their Lordships were concerned with an order allowing an application for transfer of a suit to the High Court to be tried in its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction and had to determine whether it is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent for the purpose of appeal. After considering the meaning of the word judgment, while stating that "it is not our purpose in the present case to frame an exhaustive definition of the word judgment used in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, their Lordships laid down-- "A decision on any and every point in dispute between the parties to a suit is not necessarily a judgment. The order in the present case neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground." and proceeded to hold-

(3.) Applying the tests laid down by the above decisions, we are unable to hold that the order under appeal constitutes a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The order does not dispose of the writ petition, but it merely calls for a finding on a certain matter which the learned single Judge thought was necessary to be ascertained before final orders in the writ petition are made. Irrespective of whether the finding is in favour of one or the other party, the result of the writ petition would depend upon several other factors which the learned Judge would be taking into consideration after hearing the parties. Any report of finding submitted by the District Munsif in pursuance of the order in question and the order calling for such a finding is merely a step towards a final adjudication and not an adjudication on the writ petition itself. May be this finding will have a very important bearing on the disposal of the writ petition, but nonetheless it is merely a step towards that end and does not constitute disposal of the writ petition itself nor the order finally adjudicates the writ petition. None of the two tests referred to in the Full Bench decisions of the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court, namely (AIR 1953 SC 198), whether it terminates the suit or proceeding, and ((1912) ILR 35 Mad 1) (FB), whether it affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, are satisfied. We are therefore clearly of the view that it does not constitute a "judgment" so as to entitle the aggrieved party to prefer an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent