B. DANIEL AND OTHERS Vs. SCIENTIFIC ADVISEE TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these six and odd matters, some of which have come to us in the form of writ appeals, and the other by way of a writ petition, a common question of law has been raised The question of law that has been raised is whether the Director of the Defence Electronics Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners. It is not in issue between the parties that the petitioners were appointed by the aforesaid Director as Class III employees under proviso to R. 9 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, hereinafter called The CCA Rule's. Nor is it in dispute that the said Director initiated the disciplinary proceedings against some of these petitioners by issuing charge-sheets for their alleged misconduct and by issuing show-cause notices preparatory for awarding punishment against others.

(2.) The Defence Electronics Research Laboratory, hereinafter called 'the Defence Laboratory', is an establishment of the Government of India. The several appointments of the petitioners to Class III posts in the above Defence Laboratory entitle these petitioners to hold civil posts in that Laboratory under the Government of India. While the petitioners are working in the aforesaid Defence Laboratory, the Director, as stated above, had initiated disciplinary action against them. The question that arises, on the basis of the above admitted facts, is whether the petitioners, who were appointed by the Director, are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Director or are they subject to the exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of the Scientific Adviser. The petitioners contend that the Director is not competent under the aforesaid CCA Rules to initiate disciplinary proceedings against them, while the respondents argue before us that it is competent for the Director to initiate and take disciplinary action against the petitioners. It is agreed by the parties, and in any case we hold so, that the above question who the proper authority is to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners is it the Director of the Defence Laboratory or the Scientific Advisor to the Government of India, falls to be decided by reference to the aforesaid CCA Rules of 1965, promulgated by the President of India under Article 369 (sic-309 ) of the Constitution. The aforesaid CCA Rules and, more particularly, part V of its Schedule that deals with civil posts in Defence Service contemplates appointments to be made in the Defence Research and Development Organisation by the Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence. Under the aforesaid Schedule, it is undeniable that the Scientific Adviser is alone shown as competent authority to impose on the petitioners both major and minor penalties mentioned in R. 11 of the above CCA Rules. R. 12 enumerates the disciplinary authorities. R. 13 specifies the authorities to institute disciplinary proceedings. It is, therefore, necessary to notice the relevant portions of Rr. 12 and 13:

(3.) The learned single Judge, Smt. Amareshwari, J., refused to give the above meaning to the words 'appointing authority' occurring in Rr. 12 and 13 for two reasons. Firstly, the learned Judge said that R. 2 (a) which defines appointing authority as the highest authority was ill- drafted because under R. 2 (a) an authority which actually, appointed could not be treated as an appointing authority. Secondly, it was said that in R. 12, the words 'appointing authority' do not carry the same meaning as what they might mean in R. 2 (a). With respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with any one of the above conclusions. It is not at all clear what the learned Judge meant by saying that R. 2 (a) is ill-drafted. Where the purpose of the Rule is to declare a certain authority, Irrespective of the fact whether that authority actually appointed or not, as the appointing authority it cannot be said that R. 2 (a) was ill-drafted for the purpose of achieving that object. Above all, in our opinion, there is a definite object sought to be achieved by the definitive meaning given to the words the appointing authority by R. 2 (a). That object underlying R. 2 (a) is not to permit the diffusion of disciplinary power among the various officers who might be empowered under the proviso to R. 9 (1) to make appointments. In other words, the statute desires the power to discipline must continue to inhere at the official apex so that the disciplinary action can only be taken by such ah officer who is at the apex of the official hierarchy. By giving a special meaning to the words 'appointing authority', R. 2 (a) seeks to achieve this object. In interpreting the CCA Rule, we cannot ignore this major policy preference of those rules.' It can easily be seen that in calling the highest authority as the appointing authority, R. 2 (a) read with Art. 311 of the Constitution; secures a denial of power to discipline to every authority other than the apex authority. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Judge in opining that R. 2 (a) is ill-drafted. For purposes for which it is intended, we are of the opinion that R. 2 (a) is quite well worded. In any case, we have to give effect to the statutory intention. Language used in a statute still remains the best evidence as to the intention of the law. So long as it is constitutional, it is our duty to enforce that law. We are equally unable to agree with the learned Judge in thinking that the meaning of the words "appointing authority' occurring in R. 12 is something different from the meaning which the words 'appointing authority' bear in R. 2 (a). There is no contextual justification for such a reading. Further, such a reading of the words 'appointing authority' occurring in R. 12 would be contrary to the above mentioned basic policy of the CCA Rules which is to concentrate the disciplinary powers in the hands of the highest authority only. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the second reason also.