AMPRO FOOD PRODUCTS Vs. LAKSHMI NARSAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondentland lady seeks to evict the petitioner tenant from a terraced residential building bearing D. No. 14-9-17 in Tirumalarao street, Vijayawada, on the twofold allegation that the tenant has sub-let the premises and she bona fide requires the same for her residence. The petitioner herein is Messrs. Ampro Food Products, the tenant being their local representative who both resides in the premises in question and also conducts sale of food products including biscuits. The Court of first instance allowed the petition for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, though it rejected the plea of sub-lease. The matter was appealed against, by which time a new factor had emerged, viz., a suit by the land-lady against her brother to evict him from one of her residential houses of which he was in occupation after forcibly sending her out, was decreed and an appeal therefrom also resulted in dismissal. Because of this new factor, along with the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein, inter alia, two interlocutory applications were filed; I. A. No. 4388 of 1979 under Order 41 Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, for receiving certain documents by way of additional evidence, and LA. No. 4606 of 1979 for the appointment of an authorised person to inspect the premises in question and, the other premises referred to above and submit a report. The appellate Court, while also agreeing with the first Court, dismissed the appeal as also the interlocutory applications, on the ground that the landlady could choose whether or not to occupy the adjacent building from which her brother was evicted and, therefore, it was not necessary to know whether there were such of the amenities as alleged in the application, in that building. Hence this revision by the petitionertenant.

(2.) The Principal contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that if certain new incidents have happened subsequent to the institution of the petition for eviction-aud in this case they have happened, such incidents will have to be taken into reckoning for the purpose of deciding the case of eviction, and therefore, the interlocutory applications, which have been erroneously rejected, roust be allowed. Further, if the residential building, which is admittedly said to have fallen vacant, is having the amenities as alleged, then it would be obligatory on the part of the landlady to establish that she still requires the premises in question bonafide

(3.) The counter contenion of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the landlady is at liberty, and in fact it is her choice, to exercise her option with regard to one or the other residential building. She will not be at the dictates of the tenant. It is her discretion and desire; and unless and until it is not actuated by any oblique motive, it is for her to seek eviction in respect of one or the other building. That a new incident of another residential building having fallen vacant has occurred in this case, has been countered in the interlocutory applications by stating that such of the amenities which are said to be in existence in the adjacent building do not actually exist and, therefore, the same is not suitable to her, Consequently, the premises in question, according to her original option, is suitable to her and she still continues to require the same bona fide. The provisions enacted under section 10 (3) (a) (i) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, herinafter referred to as 'the Act' do not confer any restrictive right on the landlady and, therefore, no fetters could be imposed upon her discretion.