NATIONAL UNION OF COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES Vs. M R MEHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were partners in a firm of solicitors, Messrs. Pereira Fazalbhoy and Co. Originally there were three partners, Messrs. Pereira, Amin and Fazalbhoy. A partnership deed between them was executed on the 14th January 1929. This partnership came to an end in November 1925 when Mr. Amin retired from the partnership. A newe deed of partnership was then executed between Messrs. Pereira and Fazalbhoy, respondent Nos. 2 and 3. They carried on the practice of solicitors in the name of messrs. Pereira Fazalbhoy and Co. This partnership was dissolved on the 31st March 1946. From 1st April 1946 there were three partners, Messrs, Pereira, Fazalbhoy and desai, respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4. They carried on their practice as solicitors in the name of Messrs, Pereira, Fazalbhoy and Co. until 15th November 1957, when the firm was dissloved. The second petitioner was employed as an assistant accountant in this firm. The first petitioner is a Trade Union and some of its members were the employees in the firm of Messrs. Pereira Fazalbhoy and Co., to which we will hereafter refer as the firm. In August 1957 the first petitioner wrote to the firm and submitted certain demands on behalf of the employees of the firm. The demands related to Bonus for the years ending 31st March 1955, 31st Marach 1956 and 31st March 1957 and to certain other matters. As no agreement could be reached between the parties, conciliation proceedings were started. The Conciliation Officer could not also bring about a settlement between the parties. He submitted a report to Government, who on 3rd February 1958 referred the dispute in regard to bonus for two years ending 31st March 1956 and 31st March 1957 to an Industrial Tribunal under sub-section (5) of section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to whom I will hereafter refer as the respondents, raised a preliminary objection that the profession followed by them which is that of solicitors, was not an industry within the meaning of this word lin the Industrial Disputes Act, that consequently the dispute between them and their employees was not an industrial dispute, that the reference made by government was therefore had in law, and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it. This objection was upheld by the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore passed an order that the reference could not be adjudicated upon. This order is challenged in the present Special Civil Application.

(2.) When this application came up for hearing, Mr. Banaji appeared on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society, which is a representative society of the solicitors practising in this court registered under the Indian Companies Act, Mr. Banaji stated that the Society was vitally interested in the matter, as the decision given in this case would affect not only the respondents, but all the solicitors and attorneys practising in this Court. He therefore requested that the Society should be allowed to appear in the present application. We granted the permission asked for, as our decision will affect all persons following the profession of solicitors. We also adjourned the hearing of the application for two days in order ot enable any other Union of persons employed in the officers of other solicitors to make an application for being allowed to appear, in case it chose to do so. No such application was, however, made to us. (2a) To appreciate the arguments, which have been advanced in this case, it is necessary to consider certain provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The object of the Act, as stated in the preamble, is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. The Act has, therefore, been enacted to provide for the settlement of only those disputes, which are of an industrial character, and not of all disputes between employers and employees. Clause (j) in section 2 of the Act defines the word " industry" as follows:

(3.) The principal question to be decided in this application, therefore, is whether the profession of a solicitor can be said to be an industry within the meaning of the Act. Mr. Gokhale, who appears on behalf of the petitioners, has strenuously contended that such a profession would fall within the words "business" "undertaking" and calling" contained in the definition of the word "industry". All these three words are not defined in the Act. We, therefore, have to consider their ordinary dictionary meaning. In Wesbster's dictionary the meaning given to "business" is that which busies or engages time attention or labour; constant employment regualr occupation; work. In Halsbury, Volume 32 1929 Edition, in para 487 it is stated that "trade in its primary meaning is the exchanging of goods for goods or goods for money; and in a secondary meaning it is any business carried on with a view to profit, whether manual or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned professions and from agriculture. In para 488 it is stated that business is a wider term, not synonymous with "trade", and means practically anything which is an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure. In para 489 the learned author has observed that profit or intent to make profit is not an essential part of the legal definition of a trade or business. The word "business" is therefore, a wider term than "trade" and according to its dictionary meaning it includes any occupation. Mr. Khambata, who appears on behalf of the respondents, has urged that as the word "business" is followed by the word "trade", it must take its colour from the latter word "trade", and that the business referred to in the defintion is, therefore, only that kind of business which is analogous to or which is in the nature of a trade. The latter part of the definition, which includes any calling, service, employment or industrial occupation within the meaning of industry, however, seems to indicate that the two words are not necesarily used in an analogous sense.