BIBI BATOOL Vs. PRINCIPAL JUDGE CITY CIVIL COURT BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ORDERS of eviction have been passed against the petitioners in these three petitions in respect of "corporation premises" under the special provisions contained in Chap. V - A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The petitioners in two of the three petitions have filed their petitions under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India and the petitioner in the third petition has filed its petition under Art. 226 challenging the validity of the order of eviction passed against each of them. Various grounds have been taken in each of the three petitions in support of the challenge, but all the three petitions raise one common question which is a question of law. The common question is whether the provisions of Chapter V - A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, and particularly Section 105 - B thereof, violate Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution and are therefore void. Counsel in all the three petitions stated that they were agreed that the above question be tried as a preliminary point in all these three matters as a common question and that only thereafter each of the three matters be dealt with separately if and to the extent it may be necessary.

(2.) THE provisions of Chapter V - A were introduced in the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act by a Maharashtra Act, being Act No. XIV of 1961, as an amendment to the main Act. Section 105 - A contains the definitions of "commissioner", "corporation premises" and 'unauthorised occupation in relation to any corporation premises". These definitions are not material for the purpose of this case. Section 105 - B contains six sub - sections all of which are not relevant. Sub - sections (1) and (2) are very material and they read as follows :-

(3.) THESE provisions indicate that the Commissioner is to be satisfied as mentioned therein at two stages, the first stage is before he issues a show cause notice and the second is before he makes his final order of eviction. The first satisfaction is a mere prima facie satisfaction, arrived at ex parte, on such material as is then placed before him. The only purpose or object for providing for such satisfaction is to prevent him from issuing a show cause notice wantonly or out of caprice. The final satisfaction however is to be reached after duly considering all the material placed before him after notice to the occupier of corporation premises concerned. In the decision of this case before us what is material is this final satisfaction and it is this final satisfaction to which reference will be made in this judgment.