FORBES FORBES CAMPBELL AND CO. LTD. Vs. M.G. CHITALE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By these two writ petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner -company is seeking to raise two important questions for our determination viz: (1) Whether the requirements of Section 19(ii), (iii) and (iv) of the Maharashtra Recognisation of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, (hereinafter called 'the Act'), are conditions precedent to the filing of an application for recognition by a trade union under Section 11 of the Act or the said requirements could be complied with even during the pendency of such application upto the date, of granting of recognition? (2) Whether while considering the question of granting such recognition under Section 12 of the Act, the Industrial Court should inquire into any unfair labour practice allegedly committed by the union after the filing of the application, but during its pendency and if proved should in view thereof refuse recognition?

(2.) THE two questions arise in these circumstances: The petitioner -company (Forbes Forbes Campbell and Co. Ltd.) has its head office at Forbes Building, Charanjit Rai Marg, Bombay, and three factories at its Chandivali estate at Saki Powai Road, namely, (a) Warrier Division Factory manufacturing thread cutting tools, (b) Engineering Division Factory manufacturing spring lock washers and Rotary Cutters, and (c) Communication Division Factory manufacturing rectified power plants and other electrical items. On December 15, 1975, respondent No. 2 (Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, a trade union registered under the Trade. Unions Act, 1926, representing workers in Engineering Industry/Trade in Greater Bombay) filed an application in the prescribed form (being MRTU No. 39 of 1975) for registration as a recognised Union for the petitioner -company in respect of the latter's employees in the head office and workers in the said three factories under Section 11 of the Act. In the application, it was inter alia claimed that respondent No. 2 (applicant -union) was having 100 per cent, membership of the employees and workers in the Undertaking of the petitioner -company for the whole of the period of six calendar months immediately preceding the month in which the application was made and that the Undertaking for which it was seeking recognition was engaged in Engineering Industry/Trade. It appears that subsequent to the filing of this application, respondent No. 2 (applicant -union) received a letter from the employees working in the head office of the petitioner -company, stating that they had ceased to be members of respondent No. 2 union and were resigning from its membership and, therefore, on January 19, 1976, respondent No. 2 made an application to the Industrial Court stating that it no longer sought recognition for the head office staff. On that very day, two other unions applied to the Industrial Court for being joined as parties to the application (MRTU No. 39 of 1975) as they desired to oppose respondent No. 2's application for recognition and accordingly these two other unions were impleaded as parties to the said application. By its written -statement dated January 27, 1976 and supplementary pleading dated February 26, 1976, the petitioner -company resisted the grant of recognition to respondent No. 2 on several grounds; principally the petitioner -company contended that the requirements of Section 19(ii) and (iv) had not been complied with by respondent No. 2, inasmuch as there was, contrary to Section 19(ii), failure to observe the conditions of holding the Executive Committee's meetings every three months as had been provided for in its constitution and that the constitution of respondent No. 2 did not even provide for an auditor appointed by the State Government auditing its accounts at least once in each financial year as required by Section 19(iv) and that since these requirements were not complied with by respondent No, 2 on the date of the application, the application for recognition was, not maintainable. In between on February 3, 1976, the petitioner -company filed a complaint (being ULP No. 35 of 1975) under Section 28 of the Act complaining of unfair labour practices on the part of respondent No. 2; in! particular it was alleged that the applicant -union had, subsequent to the filing of its application for recognition indulged in unfair labour practices listed at Item Nos. 1, 2(b) and 5 of Schedule III to the Act and obtained an ad interim injunction restraining the applicant -union, its office bearers, servants or agents from instigating the petitioner -company's workers to indulge in acts of violence and from threatening or assaulting its managerial and supervisory staff. On February 20, 1976, the Industrial Court directed that the application MRTU No. 39 of 1975 be referred to the investigation officer for checking the membership of respondent No. 2 and that the investigation officer should submit his report by March 8, 1976. On February 26, 1976, respondent No. 2 filed its reply to ULP No. 35 of 1975 denying all the allegations about having engaged in any of the alleged unfair labour practices and contending that a complaint had been filed with a view to delay the granting of recognition to it and that the same be dismissed.

(3.) IT appears that the several grounds mentioned above on the basis of which the petitioner -company canvassed its contention about the non -maintainability of respondent No. 2's application for recognition were heard piecemeal by the Industrial Court and some of them were negatived by that Court by its order dated March 8, 1976, while others were negatived by its order dated March 31, 1976. On the principal question, the Industrial Court took the view that the cumulative effect of Sections 11, 12 and 19 of the Act considered together was that only the conditions prescribed by Section 11(1) were required to be satisfied before a trade union, could apply for recognition and the Court was required to be satisfied that: the conditions of Section 19(ii) and (zv) were complied with before recognition was granted. Secondly as regards non -observance of the conditions specified in Section 19(ii) on the part of respondent No. 2, the Industrial Court held that since such non -observance related to a past period, that is to say had occurred during a period prior to the coming into force of the Act as also prior to the making of the application, that would not be a ground for disallowing the recognition that was sought by respondent No, 2. As regards non -compliance of the requirement of Section 19(iv), the Industrial Court took the view that it was permissible for respondent No. 2 to have its constitution amended so as to include the relevant provision therein even during the pendency of the application and that since the constitution had been subsequently amended so as to satisfy the requirement of that clause, there was no question of the application being regarded as untenable on that ground, On the question whether while considering the question of granting recognition under Section 12 of the Act, the Industrial Court should inquire into unfair labour practices allegedly committed by the applicant -union during the pendency of the application and if proved should refuse recognition, the Industrial Court took the view that since one of the objects of the Act was speedy disposal of the application for recognition, an inquiry into the complaint of unfair labour practices allegedly committed by the applicant -union subsequent to the making of the application would inordinately delay the granting of the recognition and such delay would defeat the aforesaid objective of the Act and, therefore, such inquiry should not be undertaken by the Court while considering the question of granting of recognition under Section 12 of the Act and that such inquiry could properly become the subject -matter of an application for derecognition under Section 13 of the Act. It was also held by the Industrial Court that the only grounds on which recognition could be refused even though the applicant -union was otherwise eligible for recognition, were those that had been set out in Sub -sections (5) and (6) of Section 12 of the Act and that any unfair labour practice by way of illegal strike beyond the period mentioned in Sub -section (6) of Section 12 could not be taken into account. It was further held that Section 13 of the Act sets out the grounds on which recognition already granted could be cancelled, that some of the grounds for cancelling recognition dealt with eligibility conditions, while others dealt with commission of unfair labour practices leading to derecognition and that recognition could be refused only if lack of eligibility conditions arose during the pendency of the application, but not on the other grounds pertaining to the commission of unfair labour practices mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. The Industrial Court's view on both these important aspects of the matter is being challenged by the petitioner -company in these two writ petitions, Special Civil Application No. 1927 of 1976 being directed against the impugned order dated March 8, 1976, while Special Civil Application No. 3459 of 1976 being directed against the impugned order dated March 31, 1976. Incidentally it may be stated that the Industrial Court did not permit the petitioner -company to raise a plea that respondent No. 2 could not seek recognition in respect of its workers working in the communications division factory on the ground that the said factory was and is an electronic industry and not an engineering industry and that was on the ground that no such specific plea had been raised by the petitioner -company in any of its written pleadings. The order of the Industrial Court in this behalf viz., in refusing permission to the petitioner -company to raise such a plea is also being challenged before us.