EMPEROR Vs. R K KARANJIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application by the publisher of a news magazine called " Blitz " for setting aside the order of the Government of Bombay dated February 24,, 1945, requiring the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 3,000 as security under Section 7, Sub-section (3), of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. The reason for passing the order was stated to be that in its issue of January 20, 1945, the said news magazine had published an article which contained words falling under Sections (bb) and (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act. The article, which purported to be from the editor of the paper, was a short one as follows: INFORMATION PLEASe Blitz's overall policy is to give its readers the fullest information on all topics-secret or otherwise-affecting them. As such, this paper is not bound by an antiquated convention which debars the press from releasing to the common people official secrets, confidential documents, leakages of such news as is sought to be suppressed from public knowledge. Such information is always most welcome; when brought to the editor, and will be paid for at lavish rates. Blitz has in the past paid as much as Rs. 1,000 and over for one such story. . . . Editor.

(2.) IT is the case for the Crown that the words " official secrets, confidential documents, leakages of such news as is sought to be suppressed from public knowledge" in the said article come within Clause (bb) inasmuch as they directly or indirectly tend to convey confidential information as defined in the rules made under the Defence of India Act,. or are calculated to instigate the contravention of any of the rules. IT is also contended that they come under Clause (f) of the said sub-section which includes all the expressions directly or indirectly tending to encourage or incite any person to interfere-with the administration of the law or with the maintenance of law and order, or to commit any offence. As regards Clause (f) it is contended that the offence mentioned in that clause, so far as it applies to the facts of the present case, Would be under Section 5,. Sub-section (1), of the Official Secrets Act, the material portion of which is to the effect that if any person having hi his possession or control any document or information obtained in contravention of this Act or which he has obtained or to which he has had' access owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under His Majesty wilfully communicates such document or information to any person other than a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, he is guilty of an offence, and' the punishment is provided for in Sub-section (4) of the said section. The petitioner's case is that these words in the article have not the meaning attributed to them by the respondent, that the expression " official secrets " does not mean secrets of Government Offices only but also of all offices or private institutions, and that the expression " confidential documents" also does not necessarily mean Government documents of the-nature stated in the Defence of India Rules but includes any document of a confidential nature whether Government or private. IT is further urged on behalf of the petitioner that this article was considered at a meeting of the Press Advisory Committee on February 19 of the same year and it was presided over by Mr. Drewe, the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department. The article was stated to have been objected to by the Chairman and an alleged agreement was arrived at that the objection of the Government would be satisfactorily met by the publication of a correction in the next issue of the paper. Thereupon a second article was published in the issue of February 24, in which it is stated that the readers should clearly understand that the information desired in the first article concerned such topics of public interest as the Gandhi-Jinnah talks and not secret or confidential information of any Government Department or the Defence Services or any matter, the disclosure of which may amount to a breach of faith on the part of the informant, and that any wrong impression which may have been created by the request was regretted. The petitioner says that he was given an assurance that no action would be takert against him if the correction was published with an expression of regret, but that the Government in breach of that agreement issued the notice against him under the Press Act on the same day on which the correction was: published. Mr. Drewe has filed an affidavit in this Court definitely stating that no such assurance was given rather petitioner who was told that it was open to Government to take action according to law, but that in doing so Government would take the apology into consideration, and that it was because of the apology that the petitioner was not prosecuted suit action was taken only under the Press Act.

(3.) THAT being so, the question of an invitation to the public to send in official secrets to the editor of " Blitz " must, in our opinion, be considered with reference to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act. The relevant provision on this point in that R.20Act is Section 5, Sub-section (1), which is very comprehensive in its nature. It applies not merely to Government servants but also to all persons who have obtained that secret in contravention of this Act. Reading Clause (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Press Act and Section 5, Sub-section (4), together, it is in our opinion clear that the invitation to the public to send official secrets comes within Clause (f) as well as Section 5, Sub-section (1), and that therefore it is really an invitation encouraging or inciting any person to commit an offence. As held in In re Anandabazar Patrika (1932) I. L. R. 60 Cal. 408, the burden in such an application is on the applicant to prove that the tendency is otherwise than what it is alleged to be without going into the question of the intention of the writer. We are not, therefore, concerned with the intention or the motive underlying this article but only with the direct or indirect tendency of the words used in the article itself, and in our opinion that tendency is, as alleged on behalf of the respondent, to encourage or incite any person to commit an offence. This view of the article is, in our opinion, sufficient to dispose of this application, because if the words fall under Clause (f), the order requiring the deposit of security would be justified. It is not necessary, therefore, to go into the other question as to whether the other words, viz. , " confidential documents, leakages of such news as is sought to be suppressed from public knowledge," come within either Clause (bb) or Clause (f), nor is it necessary to consider as to whether the term " official secret" also comes under Clause (bb ).