(1.) ON an application by the disputants for an action against the respondents for contempt of Court, the learned Judge of the Co-operative Court on 26-2 1990, committed the Respondents 1 to 8 for contempt of Court action and forwarded his report under Section 148-A (b)of the M. C. S. Act. After having received this report show cause notice was issued against the parties and they appeared and have shown cause, disputing the correctness of the order and the other side asserting the same,
(2.) THE dispute has been filed for a declaration that they are defaulter members and as such the respondent-Society is not entitled to recover charges and outgoings from the Disputants for the period prior to the registration. They have challenged the resolution dated 14-11-1988 adopted by the Society and sought a declaration that it is not binding on the disputants 1 and 2. The injunction is sought for restraining the Society from recovering and demanding the dues of any nature prior to the date of registration of the society and such amounts which are not covered under the Bye-laws, preventing them from taking steps for payment of the amount prior to the registration. They have sought for directions to the Society to deliver requisite share certificate to those members. Injunction from recovery or even claiming parking charges from the disputants 1 and 2, since they had purchased the parking space from the builders. By agreement with the Builder they had agreed to pay municipal taxes, water charges, maintenance and management charges, common light charges to the builder till the period of conveyance in favour of the Society or such other corporate body. They got the possession somewhere in November, 1984 and continued to pay to the builder as agreed. The Society was registered on 12-8-1986. The general body meeting was held on 10-10-1986. First Annual General meeting was to take place on 14-11-1986 to consider the subject amongst others of adopting the Auditor's statement of Accounts confirmed and adopted the accounts for the period prior to the registration during which the disputants had paid amounts to the builders. However, the allegations are made against the Society that the society is adopting coercive measures for recovery of such dues for which the disputants are not liable for the period prior to the registration of the Society and for the reason that they had already paid off the amounts to the builder, but they were treated as defaulter members and were prevented from attending the meetings. They were served with demand notices, threatened for expulsion proceedings and for obtaining a certificate from Assistant Registrar for the amount under Section 101 (1) of the M. C. S. Act. The disputants have no objection to make the payments and they are willing to make payments for the period after registration of the Society. The Society is not supplying information with particulars of dues to be paid, namely municipal taxes, monthly outgoings payable by the disputants. The disputants 1 and 2 while purchasing the flats from the builders also purchased car parking spaces and paid consideration for the same to the builders, but the Society claimed to have adopted a resolution in their general body meeting held on 14-11-1988 to charge Rs. 20/- per month for parking motor-cycle and Scooter and rs. 40/- per month for car. Since the car parking spaces were purchased by the disputants on payment from the builders as an incident of their purchasing flats and the Society has not obtained the conveyance of the property, the society cannot levy car parking charges and hence sought the declaration that the resolution adopted on 14-11-1988 for levying car parking charges is illegal and void. On such claim before the trial Court the notice was taken out for contempt of Court action against the Society, alleging that the trial Court had passed the order on 27-1-1989 restraining that the Society from recovering and demanding the dues of any nature prior to the date of registration of the Society or such amounts which are not provided for under the Bye-laws and from taking any steps, adopting coercive methods for recovery of the amount from the disputants for the period prior to the registration. This injunction order was served on the Secretary of the Society on 28 11-1989, but the opponents in defiance of the said order after the service of the injunction order issued bills dated 1-3-1989 and 1-6-1989, to the disputant No. 2 and other disputants. Under the said bills amount was shown as lump-sum amount as maintenance charges and penalty The bills were bent in contravention of the order of injunction and they have also published a notice on the notice board disclosing the names of the persons who had not cleared the arrears upto June, 19and9 and they would not be eligible for contesting the election to the Managing Committee. The disputants through their Advocate's letter had informed the Society that they were willing to pay the amounts from the date of registration as provided under Bye-law No. 79-A upon particulars of dues being given to them and the Society's action for not sending the amended bills and demanding the amount and describing them as defaulters would amount to violation of the injunction order and consequently commission of contempt of Court under Section 148-A of the Act. The disputants 1, 2 and 3 received the letter on 8th October, 1939 from the returning Officer that the disputants were defaulters and hence not eligible to contest the election. The Returning Officer is the respondent No. 8 appointed by the respondents 1 to 7 and the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 are the members ol the Managing Committee, who had the knowledge of injunction order. Therefore, they have violated the order of injunction by denying rights to the disputants to contest on the ground of being defaulters by their action of demanding the amounts which are not due and payable.
(3.) THE respondents 1 to 8 filed their reply and first tendered unconditional apology for the Manager's issuing the bills on 1-3-1989 and 1-6-1989 without their notice and consent for demanding the amounts of the dues prior to the registration of the Society. It is stated that the Manager appeared to be not aware of the interim injunction and thus mistake occurred. After the Advocate's letter was received by their Advocate the said letter was not properly looked into for its meaning and implication and, therefore, this mistake occurred. They expressed that they had no intention to violate the order of injunction and, therefore, submitted unconditional apology.