RAM SAHAI AND OTHERS Vs. AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS application in revision by the Plaintiffs is directed against the order of the learned Munsif Banda deciding issue No. 3 against them.

(2.) IT appears that the Applicants and opposite parties 2 and 3 instituted a suit for a declaration that they were entitled to the rehabilitation grant and for the recovery of the compensation and Adhivasi compensation realised by the first opposite party. The suit was resisted by the first opposite party and one of the pleas taken by him was that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit was barred by Section 330 of the UPZA and LR Act (Act I of 1951) - -hereinafter called the Act. On this plea the trial court framed the following issues:

(3.) NOW it will be noticed that this section comprises of two parts. The first part relates to 'an entry in or omission from the Compensation Assessment Roll' and the second part refers to any order passed under Part I of the Act. As both the Compensation Assessment Roll containing an entry as to the intermediary to whom the compensation in respect of the estate or part thereof is payable and an order as regards the person to whom the rehabilitation grant is payable occur in Part I of the Act, prima facie the bar of Section 330 would apply to both the matters, unless there was any other provisions in the Act saving them from its operation. So far as the Compensation Assessment Roll is concerned it is prepared in accordance with the provisions contained in Ch. III of Part I. Section 34 in that Chapter, contains a provision preserving the right of a person to establish his claim in respect of any estate or part thereof by due process of law in the court having jurisdiction, notwithstanding the finality, which subject to the right of appeal Under Section 50, attaches to the entries contained in the Compensation Assessment Roll. That this is so is further made clear by Section 70 of the Act which provides that where any suit or proceedings is pending which directly or indirectly affects or is likely to affect the right of a person to receive the whole or part of the Compensation determined under Chapter III the court or authority may require the Compensation Officer to place at its disposal the amount so payable and the same shall be disposed of in accordance with the orders of such court or authority. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the bar of Section 330 does not apply to a suit for a declaration of an intermediary's right and for the recovery of compensation in respect of the concerned estate or part thereof whether from the Compensation Officer or the person to whom it has wrongly been paid, though it would apply to suits which seek to challenge any other entry in or omission from the Compensation Assessment Roll. I would not have discussed this aspect of the matter at such length - -since the trial court has already found in favour of the Applicant on it - -had it not been for the fact that it has a vital bearing on the determination of the other question involved in this revision, to wit, whether a suit for a declaration regarding rehabilitation grant was barred from the cognizance of the Civil Court or not? In my opinion the answer to this question must be given in the negative for the simple reason that Section 73 of the Act provides for its payment to an intermediary (other than a thekedar) whose estate has been acquired under the Act. It would, therefore, appear that the payment of the rehabilitation grant is inseparably linked up with the question of the intermediary to whom the compensation in respect of the concerned estate or part of the estate is payable. I should, therefore, think that if a person could bring a suit for the recovery, of the compensation payable, or paid, in respect of an estate or part thereof in the civil Court on the footing that he is the intermediary rightly entitled to it then it follows, as a matter of necessary implication, that he can also seek in the same suit a declaration that he is also entitled to the rehabilitation grant in respect of the same estate or part thereof which has been fixed or may be fixed under Chapter V. In my opinion therefore the trial court was in error in taking the view that a suit for a declaration concerning rehabilitation grant and for its recovery, was not cognizable by the civil Court. The result, therefore, is that this revision succeeds and is allowed, but as no one appeared to oppose it I make no order as to costs. The revision having been disposed of the record of the case shall be sent down to the trial court as soon as possible so that the hearing of the case may take place there without any further delay.