RAM HAZOOR TEWARI, SON OF DARGAHI. RESIDENT OF VIL Vs. DY. DIR. OF CONSOLIDATION, U.P. LUCKNOW IN CAMP AT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Opposite party No. 4 preferred an objection under Sec. 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Assistant Consolidation Officer, by his order dated Feb. 14, 1963 indicated that it had resulted in reconciliation. The petitioner in whose favour stood the entry in the basic year preferred an appeal from the aforesaid order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated Feb. 14, 1963, alleging that he was no party to the alleged reconciliation. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowed the said appeal by his order dated April 30, 1964 and remanded the case for disposal on merits. Aggrieved by this order opposite party No. 3 preferred a revision which was dismissed on Aug. 10, 1964 on the ground that the case was governed by provisions of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963 as such no revision was competent from the appellate order dated April 30, 1964. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said revision the Consolidation Officer in accordance with the appellate order dated April 30, 1964 proceeded to decide the dispute and dispose it off by his order dated Sept. 15, 1965 in favour of the petitioner. Opposite party No. 4 then preferred an appeal which was dismissed by an Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by his order dated Oct. 15, 1965. Aggrieved by this order opposite party No. 4 preferred a second appeal which was dismissed by a Deputy Director on June 20, 1966. Then he preferred a revision under Sec. 48 (unamended) and the same was allowed by an order dated Sept. 27, 1966, a certified copy of which is annexure 2 to the petition.

(2.) The appeal which was disposed of by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by his order dated April 30, 1964 was preferred beyond the period of limitation. An application for condonation of delay under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was moved along with the memo of appeal. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) condoned the delay. In the revision disposed of by the impugned order annexure 2, it was contended on behalf of opposite party No. 4 that since the new Limitation Act of 1963 had come into force prior to April 30, 1964, the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had no jurisdiction to act under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 which alone is made applicable to the proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by virtue of its Sec. 53-B. It was thus contended that the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) acted beyond jurisdiction in condoning the delay and allowing the appeal and accordingly whatever followed subsequent thereto was a mere nullity in the eye of law. This argument found favour with the Deputy Director, who after discussing the various arguments urged before him concluded in the following words:-

(3.) The petition is opposed by opposite party No. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the contesting parties. I have not the least doubt that the view, taken by the Deputy Director that the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had no jurisdiction to condone the delay because the new Limitation Act 1963 came into force prior to the date of the order passed by him and reference in Sec. 53-B of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to Sec. 5 of the old Act could be of no avail is manifestly erroneous. The new Limitation Act 1963 provides in sub-section (2) of Sec. 29 for the application of Sections 4 to 24 to all cases for which limitation is to be computed according to the provisions of any special or local law subject to there being anything in such special or local law to exclude their application in express terms. It shall thus appear that even if the reasoning of the Deputy Director be for a moment assumed to be correct, Sec. 5 of the new Limitation Act which corresponds to Sec. 5 of the old Limitation Act, would apply to the proceedings before the consolidation authorities by virtue of Sec. 29(2) of the new Limitation Act since there is nothing in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to exclude its application. Moreover, a reference to Sec. 8 of the General Clauses Act would show that in the absence of anything to the contrary a reference to the provisions in an enactment of another enactment subsequently repealed and re-enacted will be construed to refer to a corresponding provision in the enactment referred to. For the sake of convenience Sec. 8 of the General Clauses Act may be reproduced. It runs as follows:-