(1.) One Kashi Das died. Ramdeo Das, claiming to be the Chela of Kashi Das, made an application under Section 192 of the Succession Act in the Court of the District Judge of Banaras and alleged that the opposite-party Baijnath Das was threatening to take wrongful possession of the property which consisted of two houses. The applicant further alleged that the deceased had left a will in his favour. The applicant also alleged that the deceased Mahant Kashi Das had executed a will on 13-2-1908, in favour of his Chela Ram Saran Das who, in his turn, had executed another will dated 9-2-1926, in favour of Kashi Das. It was further alleged that Kashi Das also had executed a will in favour of the applicant, Ramdeo Das, before his death. Before taking proceedings under Section 192 the learned District Judge issued notice to Baijnath Das. Baijnath Das filed various objections and claimed that the application under Section 192 of the Succession Act did not lie. The learned District Judge after having disposed of the preliminary points fixed 19-4-1950, for final orders. The operative portion of the order passed by him is as follows:
(2.) Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, relied on Section 299 of Indian Succession Act and has urged that every order passed by a District Judge is appealable. Section 299 is as follows:
(3.) Section 299 does not say that every order made by a District Judge is appealable. It limits it to orders made by a District Judge by virtue of the powers conferred upon him by the Succession Act and as has already been said in -- 'Bhupendra Narain Singh's case' (A), the order must be an adjudication of the rights of the parties and a direction to be carried out by them by virtue of any of the powers conferred upon him by the Succession Act. In the case before us all that the learned District Judge did was to fix a final date for hearing. It cannot be said that he exercised his jurisdiction under Section 192 and passed any order thereunder. Even if he did pass an order under Section 192, the appellant would have had to satisfy us that Section 209 does not apply to it. Section 209 provides that: