J K IRON AND STEEL COMPANY LIMITED Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS statement of case has been submitted and a question of law referred to us by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), in pursuance of an order passed by this court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act (hereinafter called the Act). The question of law is in the following words :

(2.) IN respect of the assessment year 1945-46, the assessee, at whose instance this reference has been made, filed two appeals, one under section 33 of the Act and the other under section 14(1) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, to the Tribunal in respect of certain disallowances made by the INcome-tax Officer and affirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appeals, being connected, were heard together on October 28, 1952. On October 31, 1952, the Account Member of the Tribunal dictated a draft order governing both the appeals. This draft order was placed before the Judicial Member who on November 7, 1952, appended certain observations to the draft order of the Account Member. Thereafter the draft order of the Accountant Member was fair typed and along with the order of the Judicial Member, placed before both the Members for their signatures. Both the Members signed their respective judgments. They, in their separate judgments, passed the same order, i.e., that the appeal should be dismissed. At the time when the Members signed their respective judgments, both the orders were before them.

(3.) THE submission that was made before the Federal Court was that, inasmuch as the judgment contemplated was that by the while court, separate opinions by the judges who constitute it could not be given. This was repelled by Sir Shah Mohammed Sulaiman J., who held the it was quite within the competence of the judges of the Federal Court to write separate judgments even when concurring in the conclusion. We are, therefore, unable to accept Mr. Pathaks submission that it was not competent for the two Members who constitute the Tribunal to write different, though concurring, judgments. THE submission that in any case there should have been an order on behalf of the whole Tribunal, like our Per Curiaem or "By the Court orders, which are different from the opinion of the individual judges who constitute the bench hearing a case and inasmuch as no such order was prepared, there is no order of the Tribunal in the eye of the law, in our view, is equally untenable. It is not necessary that in a case where the conclusion of both the Members is the same, there should be a separate order on behalf of the Tribunal. THE matter would have been different if they had disagreed and the case was referred to the President. Even in this court quite often when the judgments, though separate, are concurrent and the conclusion is the same, a separate order on behalf of the court as Per Curiaem or "By the Court is not always prepared. We are, therefore, unable to accept this submission of Mr. Pathak also.