K. MUHAMMAD SUKRI SAHIB Vs. THELAPURATH MADHAVA KURUP AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE respondent is the owner of a shop in Calicut town and the appellant is his tenant, holding the shop on a month -to -month tenancy. The respondent filed O.S. No. 405 of 1943 for the eviction of the appellant; but before he could obtain a decree, the Non -Residential Building Rent Control Order, 1942, had been amended on nth July, 1944. Apparently unaware of the amendment, a, decree was passed in the respondent's favour on the 8th September, 1944. Almost immediately, the respondent applied for possession, obtained an ex parte order in his favour, and was actually put in possession on the 15th September, 1944. On the 28ih October, 1944, the appellant drew the attention of the executing Court to the amendment on the nth July, 1944, and pointed out that the Court had acted ultra vires, in that its order delivering possession to the respondent was void. The Court then took action under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and set aside its previous order on the ground that it would not have passed that order if its attention had been drawn to the amendment. The matter was taken in appeal to the Subordinate Judge, who affirmed the decision of the trial Court. The matter came before Panchapagesa Sastri, J., in A.A.A.O. No. 43 of 1946. The learned Judge held that despite the passing of the amendment on the 11th July, 1944, the law to be applied, to the case was the law as it existed at the date of filing the suit. He therefore allowed the appeal with costs throughout. At the same time, he granted leave to appeal under the Letters Patent.

(2.) THERE can be no doubt, on the plain words of the amended Clause 8 of the Non -Residential Building Rent Control Order, 1942, that the tenant was entitled to remain in possession.

(3.) THE difficulty which the learned Judge felt in giving Clause 8 its plain interpretation was that to do so would be to infringe the principle that a new legislation should not affect existing rights unless the wording of the statute makes it clear, expressly or by necessary implication, that it is to have retrospective effect. Although the suit was still pending at the time when the amendment was made, yet it has not been contended that the introduction of this legislation created a new law to be applied by the Court and that the decree passed by the Court was consequently not a valid one. The execution proceedings were filed long after the amendment came into force. Mr. Venkatasubramaniam has been constrained to argue that the moment a person files a suit he obtains thereby a vested right to have applied not only to the suit, but to all execution proceedings also, the law relating to execution as it existed at the time of filing the suit. We know of no such principle; and we find no reason to think from the cases that have been cited before us that if a new law is introduced restricting the right to execute, execution proceedings can nevertheless be instituted if such a right existed on the date of the filing of the suit. Our attention has been drawn to the judgment of Sulaiman, J., in The United Provinces v. Mt. Atica Begum, (1941) 1 M.L.J. (Supp.) 65 :, 3 F.L.J. 97 :, I.L.R. 1941 Kar. 73 (F.C.) in which reference is made to certain English cases interpreting British Statutes said to be similar to the Statute here under consideration; but we have not seen those decisions or those Statutes and we are not at all convinced that any such general principle exists.