TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF MADRAS Vs. BOMBAY CO P LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE second appeals arise out of a suit instituted by the trustees of the Port trust, Madras, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,360 which they had to pay their workman, one Danapal, under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923, Second appeal No. 1005 of 1962 has been preferred by the plaintiff, the Port Trust, against the decree of the Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, dismissing the suit on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. The Court of first instance held the other way and, finding on other issues also in favour of the plaintiff, decreed the suit as prayed for. Second Appeal No. 1550 of 1962 has been preferred by the defendant for costs disallowed on appeal.

(2.) THE case raises certain interesting questions and I shall first set out the relevant and material facts as they have emerged finally for consideration in the second appeal. The injured workman, Danapal, formed part of the shore labour force at Madras Harbour of the Port Trust and, when on duty on 11th June 1955, at South Quay I in the harbour, he sustained injuries from a cart belonging to the defendant heavily loaded with iron-mesh. As a result of the injury, the workman lost completely and permanently the use of both his legs and had to be declared unfit for further service. The injured workman, by Ex. A-14, applied to the commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, for securing the compensation amounts. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation addressed the Port trust by letter dated 7th January 1956, regarding the steps taken to compensate the workman, and the Port Trust worked out the disablement compensation at Rs. 3,360 and made the payment under the provisions of the Workmen's compensation Act. The suit out of which the present second appeal arises was instituted on the averment that the disablement of the workman was due to the negligence and carelessness of the defendant, and the Port Trust, referring to section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, hereinafter called the Act, claimed that under the provisions of the said section, the plaintiff had a right to be indemnified by the defendant. If defence it was inter alia contended that the accident was brought about by the workman himself by his own negligence, that the amount paid to the workman though within the limits set out by the workmen's Compensation Act, was not reasonable, that the defendant is not liable under the Act, and that in any event the suit was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. The principal issues of fact that arose for consideration at the trial were, whether the injury was the result of the negligence of the workman himself as pleaded for the defendant and whether compensation claimed was reasonable. There was also an issue of fact whether the permanent and total disablement was the result of the alleged accident. The Court of first instance rejected to contention that the accident was caused by the negligence act of the workman himself and found that the accident had been caused by the negligence of the cartmen of the defendant who had given evidence on behalf of the defendant as D. Ws. 1 and 2. It was held that the defendant was clearly responsible for the consequences of the accident and that it had resulted in the permanent and total disablement of the workman. The amount of compensation paid to the workman was found reasonable. It was further held by the Court of first instance, that, as an employer is liable whenever his servant committed tort in the course of his employment, the defendant was liable and answerable for the tort of his servants, the cartmen. The contention that a suit in the Civil Court was not maintainable was overruled. On appeal the learned City Civil Judge has confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the injury to the workman, Danapal, was caused by the negligence on the part of the defendant's servants and the quantum of compensation was not questioned. However, the learned Additional Judge, City Civil Court, accepted the contention on behalf of the defendant that by reason of Section 19 of the Act the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In that view, the suit was dismissed. In the view that the defendant had failed in its contention on merits, the appellate Court directed the parties to bear their respective costs throughout.

(3.) THE principal question that has arisen for consideration and argued at some length is the question of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit. Learned counsel for the defendant, no doubt, addressed some arguments on the question whether the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant's servants. But this is a pure question of fact on which both the Courts below have concurred and I see no reason to differ from the finding that it is a tortious act of the defendant's servants that resulted in the permanent disablement of the plaintiff's workman.