P.M. RAVAL AND ORS. Vs. K.G. RAMACHANDRAN, MINOR AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners in the former two writ petitions are one and the same and they are the tenants of premises Nos. 16 and 17 Poonamallee High Road, Madras -3 and respondents 1 to 3 therein are the owners of the said premises. The petitioner in W.P. No. 1154 of 1971 along with his brother owns premises Nos. 40 41 and 42, Irusappa Maistry Street, Madras, while the first respondent in that writ petition is the tenant of the said premises. The prayer in the former two writ petitions is for the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the fourth respondent in the writ petitions, who is functioning as the Rent Controller, not to proceed with H.R.C. Nos. 2489 of 1966 and 2942 of 1963 respectively, pending on his file. Those rent control petitions were filed under Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, (Tamil Nadu Act XIX of 1960), hereinafter referred to as the Act, for fixation of fair rent in respect of the buildings in question. Similarly, W.P. No. 1154 of 1971 prays for the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the second respondent therein, namely, the Rent Controller, from proceeding with the Rent Control proceedings H.R.C -No. 3885 of 1970, which was a petition filed under Section 4 of the Act for fixation of fair rent.

(2.) FOR the purpose of understanding the arguments advanced before me, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 4(1) of the Act states that the Controller shall, on application by the tenant or the landlord of a building and after holding such inquiry as the Controller thinks fit fix the fair rent for such building in accordance with the principles set out in Sub -section (2) or in Sub -section (3) as the case may be, and such other principles as may be prescribed. Sub -section (2) deals with the principles applicable to a residential building, while Sub -section (4) deals with the principles applicable to a non -residential building. We are concerned in the writ petitions only with a non -residential building and as there is no substantial difference between the two sub -sections, I reproduce Sub -section (3) of Section 4 below:

(3.) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is this. The Supreme Court in the decision referred to above has held that Rule 12 is plainly beyond the scope of the statute and therefore is not valid. Consequently once Rule 12 is out of the picture, the cost of construction cannot be arrived at by the Rent Controller. The basis of this argument is that the statutory provision contemplates the cost of construction being ascertained only by applying the rates for such classes of non -residential buildings as may be prescribed and once such provision has been held to be ultra vires, there is no prescription of rates and consequently the cost of construction cannot be calculated, as provided for in the statute. The second limb of the argument is that even assuming that the cost of construction can be ascertained, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it means only the original cost of construction, still the cost as contemplated by Sub -section (3) (b) (i) cannot be ascertained, because the cost of construction must be reduced by the depreciation at such rates as may be prescribed and the depreciation to be deducted has been prescribed only in Rule 14 and Schedule II and those rates of depreciation cannot be applied. I shall now consider the validity of these submissions.