V.C.K. BUS SERVICE (P) LTD., COIMBATORE AND ANR. Vs. H.B. SETHNA AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE petitions, which ask for a rule or prohibition restraining the second respondent, the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal, Coimbatore from proceeding with the enquiry into certain claims preferred by the first respondent in each of these petitions, raise a point of jurisdiction of that Tribunal. The motor accident occurred on 6 -1 -1961, in which the bus belonging to the first of the petitioners and a motor car owned by the first respondent in one of these petitions were involved. The accident resulted in personal injuries to the claimants before the Tribunal. Section 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for a constitution by the Government, by notification in the Official Gazette of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, for specified areas, for adjudicating upon claims for compensation, in respect of accidents involving death or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. By a notification dated 12 -7 -1961, the District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, was constituted as Tribunal for such a purpose. Before then such claims were adjudicated on suits in civil courts. The procedure to be followed by applicants before the Tribunal is prescribed by S. 110 -A, which includes a provision as to limitation for applications. The application should be filed before the Tribunal within 60 days of the occurrence of the accident. To sub -section (3) of S. 110 -A, which provides for this, is attached a proviso, the effect of which is that delays may be condoned by the Tribunal if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The effect of constitution of such a Tribunal upon the jurisdiction of civil courts is to be found in S. 110 -F. That section expressly states that where a Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal for the particular area. Apparently, in view of this bar, and the provision as to limitation and the fact that the accident here took place prior to the date of the notification constituting the tribunal, its jurisdiction to entertain the claims would appear to have been questioned by the petitioners. But the Tribunal did not accept this objection, with the result that the petitioners have moved this court for the relief I have mentioned.

(2.) SECTION 110 -F, as I said, expressly takes away the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain such claims from the date a claims tribunal has been constituted for any area. But it is argued that this bar to civil court's jurisdiction will apply only to cases of accidents which occurred subsequent to the date of the constitution of the Tribunal and not to accidents happening earlier to that date. The basis for this argument is that sub -section (3) of Section 110 -A provides for a narrower period of limitation for an application for claims than for a suit under the Limitation Act and that a claimant has therefore a vested right to ask for his remedy within the larger period of limitation. Since this vested right is affected, so is the argument, by Section 110 -F it should not be read as retroactive in its effect upon civil court's jurisdiction to entertain suits involving causes of action arising anterior to the date of constitution of a Tribunal. In support of this contention reliance is placed on a judgment of Jagadisan J. in Chandrasekara Pillai v. Narayanaswami, C. R. P. No. 1520 of 1962 dated 7 -2 -1963 a short note of it is reported in, 76 MLW 44, I shall presently refer to this decision.

(3.) IT is equally a well -settled principle of construction that exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction will not be taken for granted, in the absence of express words or necessary intendment of the statutory provision to that effect. Exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction will however be assumed where a statute prescribes a special forum for adjudicating particular classes of causes of action. This is on the principle that the special excludes the general. On other principles, again well settled, is that a statute which may affect vested rights will not be read or understood as having retrospective effect unless the statute contains words or is capable of necessary intendment that retrospective effect is meant. Though a few cases at the Bar were referred to, which bear on these principles. I do not think it necessary to refer to them.