KHIVRAJ CHORDIA Vs. G MANIKLAL BHATTAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE tenant has preferred this revision petition under S. 25 of the Madras buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The respondent who is the landlord filed a petition for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the tenant was guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent for 18 months from March 1961 to September 1962, that the respondent required the premises, which is a car shed, for his own use and occupation to keep his car, which he had been garaging in a rented shed and that the tenant, having taken the premises as a car shed for garaging his car, was putting it to a different use, storing his goods for umbrella business. Both the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority held that the landlord had not made out a case for evicting the tenant on the two later grounds. They concurrently held that the property was not leased for the express purpose of being used as a garage, that the tenant had been using the premises for his business purposes only, that the landlord did not require the premises for garaging his car, as the latter had several garages of his own and that, as a matter of fact, certain garages belonging to the landlord, had become vacant and were available for his use, but yet he did not make use of any of them which had fallen vacant. On the question of wilful default, both the Rent controller as well as the appellate authority decided against the tenant and ordered eviction; this is the only question that survives for decision in the revision petition.

(2.) THE Rent Controller found that the tenant was guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent for the month of March 1961, and ordered eviction. It may be mentioned that the rent for the month of March 1961 must have been paid by 304-1961, and the rent was sent on 9-5-1961, by money order and it was returned, evidently because the landlord declined to receive it, with the result the delay was less than two weeks. On appeal, the appellate authority took the view that the tenant was guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent not only for the month of march 1961, but for subsequent months also. Learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant), at the outset, contended that the appellate authority ought not to have considered the question of wilful default for the subsequent months and should have confined itself to the question of default in the payment of rent for the month of March 1961. He urged that even though in the petition the landlord relied upon the default in the payment of rent for 18 months from March 1961 to September 1962, in the course of the enquiry and the arguments before the Rent Controller, the parties confined and restricted themselves to the question of wilful default in the payment of rent for the month of March 1961 alone. In this connection, learned counsel drew my attention to the evidence adduced on both sides as well as to the discussion of the question in the order of the Rent Controller. He also contended that because the appellate authority had exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with material irregularity in embarking upon the investigation of an aspect which was really not in issue between the parties and the parties therefore did not focus their attention and adduce evidence touching that question, the petitioner has raised this objection in the forefront in the memo of revision petition filed in this court. There is considerable force in this contention, and I am satisfied that the parties confined and restricted themselves to the question of wilful default in the payment of rent for the month of March 1961 only, and that the Rent controller, therefore, deliberately did not express any opinion regarding the alleged default in the payment of rent for months following. I am unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that because the point framed by the Rent Controller included the question of default for the later months also, the appellate authority would have jurisdiction to consider the broader question as well. I have no doubt whatsoever that if counsel for the landlord and the tenant had argued and stressed the point as to wilful default in the payment for the later months, surely the Rent Controller would have made some reference to that argument and also given his findings thereon in his order. But in more places than one, the Rent controller discusses and gives his finding only with regard to wilful default in the payment of rent for the month of march 1961. The matter was put thus by the Rent Controller;

(3.) I shall now take up the question of default in the payment of rent for March 1961. The findings of the courts below are wrong and cannot be sustained as they have failed to apply their mind to the crucial question arising for decision, and have further misdirected themselves in their perspective of approach. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the question whether the tenant is guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent is essentially a question of fact, and that when there was evidence adduced before the Rent Controller, which evidence had been accepted both by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, I should not interfere with the finding in revision under S. 25 of the Act. He drew my attention to some of the decisions of this court and the decisions of the Supreme court in House Rent Control legislations of other States which have dealt with the limitations of the powers of revision of the High Court or the District Court when dealing with revisions against orders of the appellate authority. It is unnecessary to refer to those decisions in detail as the principles are well settled. The power of revision under S. 25 of the Act is conferred expressly for the purpose of enabling the court of revision to satisfy itself "as to the legality or regularity or propriety of the order passed in the proceeding and also pass such orders in reference thereto as the court may think fit" as the Supreme Court has pointed out in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan, (a case arising under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction act of 1949) the power of revision is in striking contrast to the High Court's power of revision under S. 115 C. P. C. The power conferred under the Rent Control Act is not confined to mere questions of jurisdiction or mere irregularities committed by the Rent Control Authorities, but the powers are much wider. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the power of revision cannot be equated with the appellate jurisdiction empowering the court of revision to interfere with decisions on plain questions of fact. The terms "legality, regularity and propriety" are well understood terms denoting well recognised grounds of judicial interference by the courts of revision. These words are undoubtedly wide enough to cover both questions of law and questions of fact, where the authority has overlooked an important piece of evidence or its reasonings and findings are based upon erroneous assumptions, or it failed to consider the scope of the requirement of a particular statutory provision. It is not possible to formulate or classify the circumstances under which the court of revision can exercise its powers to interfere on questions of fact. It will be seen that the Supreme Court in affirmed the decision of the High Court reversing the concurrent findings reached by the Rent Control authorities, as the latter had misdirected themselves in the consideration of the crucial question. The Supreme Court put the matter thus at p. 658: