THE COIMBATORE PIONEER MILLS, LTD., "B" MILLS Vs. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE three petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution have been heard together, as they arise out of a common order of the Presiding Officer Labour Court, Coimbatore, which is constituted as the Appellate Authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The petitioners are three different companies newly started and carrying on business as textile mills. As required by sections (1) of the Act, each of them submitted to the Certifying Officer Draft Standing Orders for adoption in the industrial establishment concerned. After complying with the provisions of Section 5 as to notice to workmen calling for their objections if any, and hearing them, the Certifying Officer certified the Standing Orders with certain alterations and modifications. To the extent to which the petitioners felt aggrieved against the certification, each of the petitioners filed a separate appeal before the prescribed Appellate Authority. That Authority disposed of the appeals together, substantially confirming the orders of the Certifying Officer.

(2.) IN this Court, three grounds have been raised, one peculiar to W.P. No. 795 of 1959 and the rest of them common to all the petitions. The first ground is that upon notice service upon them, the workmen of the Pioneer Textiles, Peelamedu raised no objection before the Certifying Officer to the Standing Orders as submitted by the management of that company, but nevertheless the Certifying Officer assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the fairness and reasonableness or otherwise of some of the provisions of the Standing Orders. This, it is said, the Certifying Officer had no power to do in the absence of objections being raised by the workmen concerned, and thus the Certifying Officer being called upon to adjudicate upon them. The second ground is that while making alterations and modifications in the Standing Orders, the Certifying Officer gave no reasons therefore, and that in such circumstances it is not within the ambit of the Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of such modifications or alterations and give reasons therefore. The third ground is that in respect of Clause (o) of paragraph 19 of each of the three Standing Orders, the petitioners were not aggrieved against the -orders of the Certifying Officer and did not file appeals so that it is not open to the -Appellate Authority to enlarge the scope of the appeals and make alterations to that clause on his own view of the fairness or reasonableness or otherwise of that clause.

(3.) WITH reference to the above statutory provisions, in support of the first ground, the contention on behalf of the petitioner in W.P. No. 795 of 1959 is that the word. 'adjudicate' in Section 4 coupled with the provision in Section 5 for notice to the workmen and opportunity to them of being heard, unmistakably indicates that it is; only where there is a proposal and opposition or in other words, there is a lis in that sense, that any occasion arises for the Certifying Officer to adjudicate on the rival claims. It is argued on that basis that in this case the workmen of the Pioneer Textiles, Peelamedu, having filed no objections before the Certifying Officer, it was not within the power of the Certifying Officer, nevertheless, to assume that the Standing Orders were not fair or reasonable in any particular matter and proceed upon that view to adjudicate upon these issues. On the other hand, for the workmen it is said that as after the amendment effected by Act XXXVI of 1956, the Certifying Officer is given the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders, the Certifying Officer could exercise that jurisdiction irrespective of whether the workmen have filed objections or not. It seems to me that the contention on behalf of the workmen overlooks the phraseology used in Section 4 and the effect, in relation to it, of Sub -sections (1) and (2) of Section 5. ' Adjudicate' in Section 4, to my mind, without doubt, indicates not that the Certifying Officer will of his own accord apply himself and decide as to the fairness or reasonableness of any Standing Orders, but he will do so only when the parties are at issue on the fairness or reasonableness of such provisions. It is true that before the amendment introduced by Act XXXVI of 1956 the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on a matter of that sort and he had merely to see whether Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 4 were complied with. If they were complied with, the Certifying Officer had no option but to certify the Standing Orders. But after the amendment the Certifying Officer is empowered to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders. Even approaching the interpretation of Section 4 from the standpoint of how sections 4 and 5 read before the amendment, I think the effect of a combined reading of sections 4 and 5 is that the Certifying Officer will have jurisdiction to pronounce upon the fairness or reasonableness of any of the provisions of the Standing Orders, only if and when the concerned Union or the workmen raised an objection and thus the parties come into controversy, and not otherwise. It is, however, contended that the Act being mainly intended for the benefit of the workmen, it should be taken, as a result of the amendment introduced by Section 32 of Act XXXVI of 1956, that the Certifying Officer is irrespective of whether the workmen filed objections or not, required to apply his own mind and, with his knowledge of the prevailing conditions of labour in similar concerns decide upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders. I can see no warrant or justification for introducing into Section 4 any such principle. Sections 5 and 6 clearly contemplate filing of objections, hearing, and decision, and then making it open to the aggrieved party to file an appeal before the prescribed authority. All these point to the nature and scope of the jurisdiction of the Certifying Officer, when he is entrusted with the authority to adjudicate upon the matters mentioned. I hold, therefore, that the Certifying Officer could only have jurisdiction under, Section 4 to adjudicate upon the objections from workmen or the management in relation to the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders, and that if there are no objections to the Standing Orders, as submitted by the Management the Certifying Officer has then only to see whether Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 4 have been complied with and if they have been complied with, to certify the Standing Orders. It follows, therefore, that the Standing Orders as filed by the management in W.P. No. 795 of 1959 will have to be certified. The matter will go before the Certifying Officer for fresh consideration of the Standing Orders submitted by the Pioneer Textiles, Peelamedu.