MADURAI CITY CO-OPERATIVE MILK SUPPLY UNION Vs. FOOD INSPECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision is directed against the order Of the learned Sessions Judge, Madurai dismissing the appeal against the conviction of the petitioners of an offence under Section 7 read with Section 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. This being a third offence of the kind committed by the first petitioner, Madurai City Co-operative Milk Supply Union, it was sentenced to any a fine of Rs. 3000, the minimum prescribed by the proviso to Subsection (1) (a) (iii) of Section 18, The second petitioner, who was the secretary of the first petitioner, was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 30. Both the courts below have found that the sample of cow's milk boiled and cooled, purchased from the first petitioner, through its salesman Uthaman, on the morning of 2-2. 2. 1959 from the quantity in a sealed can, and meant for the Maternity home, maintained by the municipality, was adulterated with added water of 11 per cent. The Public Analyst for Madurai Municipality certified the adulteration to be 14 per cent; but the Director, Central Food Laboratory at Calcutta reported that the milk was adulterated with 11 per cent of added water. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 provided that the certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory shall supersede the report given by the Public Analyst under Sub-section (1) and by Sub-section (5) the certificate is final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.

(2.) THE main attack against the conviction is that the food inspector, who laid the complaint, had no valid authority or consent required by Section 20 as a condition to the institution of the prosecution. The Food Inspector in his evidence stated that he was authorised to institute the complaint by a notification in C. O. M. S. No. 1861 Health dated 6. 6. 1958 published in the Fort St. George Gazette part 1-A page, 350 dated 20. 8. 1958. This notification reads: In exercise of the power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Central Act 37 of 1954) the Governor of Madras hereby authorises the Food Inspectors appointed under the said Act to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act.

(3.) SECTION 9 of the Act authorises the State Government to appoint by notification, persons having the prescribed qualifications to be Food Inspectors for the purposes of the Act, and they shall exercise their powers within such local areas as that Government may assign to them. It is not disputed that the Food Inspector had been duly appointed as such. But the argument is that the Government notification above extracted being a general authorisation of all Food Inspectors without reference a particular prosecution, it is not in consonance with the requirements o? Section 20 of the Act. It is contended that what the section contemplate if a specific authorisation in respect of a particular prosecution and not an omnibus delegation. Section 20 (1) reads, No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written on sent of the State Government, or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the Stale Government or a local authority. The sub-section has a proviso which need not be set out for the purpose of this case. The object of Sub-section (1) obviously is to avoid indiscriminate prosecution without scrutiny in each case of particular facts and circumstances justifying penal action under the Act. The section, therefore, requires certain conditions to be complied with before a court can take cognizance of a prosecution under the Act. It states that the prosecution may be instituted (1) by the State Government, (2) local authority, (3) a person authorised by the State Government and (4) a person authorised by the local authority. In addition, the section also provides that a prosecution may be instituted with the written consent of any of the four categories of authorities aforesaid. When the section speaks institution of prosecution with the written consent of any of those authorities, it plainly means that the consent should be specifically related to a particular offence with reference to which it is intended to institute a prosecution. If the authority that institutes a prosecution is the State Government or local authority, in that case no written consent is of course required. But the argument is that if the person instituting a prosecution is one authorised by the State Government or a local authority, the authorisation should be specific in relation to a particular case and not in general terms applicable to all prosecutions, as and when they may arise. This construction by Sri Mohan Kumaramangalan appearing for the petitioners is based on the words "in this behalf" in Sub-section (1 ). He contends that the words import an intention that "the State Government or a local authority'' before it authorises a person should apply its mind to the fact of the particular prosecution and not leave it to the person authorised to decide whether a particular prosecution should be laid. According to the learned Counsel. in this "behalf" has reference to "no prosecution. . . shall be instituted except. . . that is to say, to the particular institution of a certain prosecution in view. It is further contended that this construction is reinforced by the fact that the written consent contemplated by the sub-section is undoubtedly related to each particular prosecution. I am unable to agree with the construction contended for. The words "in this behalf" do not bear, in the context, the meaning attributed to them. In my view, they mean no more than the authority vested in the State Government or a local authority is for the purpose of enabling the person to institute a prosecution. The intention appears to be to provide for a delegation by the State Government or a local authority of its power to institute prosecutions under the Act. To construe the section in the way the learned Counsel has asked me to do, would defeat the very purpose of this provision for delegation of the power to institute a prosecution. Once authorised to institute a prosecution, the authority so vested in the person is of the same quality and Virtue as the power of the State Government or a local authority to institute a prosecution. This is contrast with a case o? a person enabled to institute a prosecution with the written consent of any of the parties enumerated by the sub-section. In any opinion, therefore, the food Inspector in this case was competent to lay the complaint.