PRAVINKUMAR ALIAS PRAVINCHANDRA BHAGWAJI GANATRA Vs. COMPETENT AUTHORITY AND DEPUTY COLLECTOR ULC RAJKOT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The order passed by the Competent Authority at Rajkot (respondent No.1 herein) on 15th September, 1982 under sec. 8 (4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the Act for brief) as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Urban Land Tribunal at Ahmedabad (respondent No.2 herein) on 10th February 1988 in Appeal No. Rajkot-225 of 1987 is under challenge in this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. By this impugned order, respondent No.1 declared the holding of the petitioner to be in excess of the ceiling limit by 2781.78 square meters.

(2.) The facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The petitioner filled in his declaration in the prescribed form under sec. 6 (1) of the Act with respect to his holding in the office of respondent No. 1. That form was duly processed by respondent No. 1. After observing necessary formalities under sec. 8 of the Act, by his order passed on 15th September 1982 under sec. 8 (4) thereof, respondent No. 1 declared the holding of the petitioner to be in excess of the ceiling limit by 2781.78 square meters. Its copy is at Annexure A to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner carried the matter in appeal before respondent No. 2 under sec. 33 of the Act. It came to be registered as Appeal No. Rajkot-225 of 1987. By the order passed on 10th February 1988, it came to be dismissed after its preliminary hearing on the ground that it was time-barred. Its copy is at Annexure B to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner has thereupon approached this Court by means of this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of questioning the correctness of the order at Annexure A to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure B to this petition. It transpires from the appellate order at Annexure B to this Petition that the order at Annexure A to this petition was challenged more than 5 years after its date. The delay was to the tune of 5 years 3 months. At the stage of its preliminary hearing, it was found from the material on record that the order at Annexure A to this petition was challenged earlier in appeal and that appeal came to be registered as Appeal No. Rajkot-82 of 1982. That appeal was found deficient with respect to certain requirements of law and it was sent back on 19th November 1982. It is the case of the petitioner that he was not aware of disposal of the earlier appeal and, since the earlier appeal was not disposed of, he filed another appeal challenging the order at Annexure A to this petition.

(3.) Learned Assistant Government Pleader Shri Patel for the respondents has kept one officer from the office of respondent No.2 present with records of the case in connection with the aforesaid contention taken on behalf of the petitioner. He has brought with him the Appeal Register with respect to appeals arising from matters within the urban agglomeration of Rajkot for 1982-83. In the register, along with other particulars, in last but one column, a noting is made regarding how each appeal has come to be disposed of. With respect to Appeal No. Rajkot-82 of 1982, the endorsement is that the appeal was returned for want of certain particulars for the purpose of supplying deficiencies. The officer from the office of respondent No. 2 has also brought with him the outward register for the relevant period beginning from 25th May 1982 up to 31st December 1982. Entry No. 3705 shows despatch of the appeal to the appellant on 19th December 1982 at the address given in the memo of appeal. That address of the appellant tallies with his address as shown in the title cause of this petition. Since it was sent by post, a presumption as to its delivery can be raised under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It thus becomes clear that the order at Annexure A to this petition was appealed against and it was not pursued further by supplying the deficiencies found at that stage. It would certainly mean that the petitioner, was not interested in prosecuting with the appeal at that stage. It would amount to its dismissal for want of prosecution. That order would become final in view of sec. 33 (3) of the Act.