CHHABILDAS MEHTA MLA Vs. GUJARAT LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY GUJARAT STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition raises issues of great constitutional importance. Though various reliefs are claimed in the petition the main question which arises for consideration in the petition is whether a certain Resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Gujarat State by a majority of members present and voting for adjournment of the Assembly sine die is void as being outside the power of the Assembly. The facts giving rise to the petition are few and undisputed and they may be gathered from the transcript of the proceedings of the House produced before us by the Assembly at the time of the admission of the petition.

(2.) The petitioners are Members of the Gujarat Legislative Assembly belonging to the opposition. The present ruling party in the Assembly is Congress (Organisation). The Assembly was summoned by the Governor to meet on 18th February 1970 in exercise of his power under Article 174 of the Constitution and according to the schedule fixed by the Speaker the Assembly Session was to continue upto 8th April 1970. The Government business was first taken up by the Assembly and it occupied the time of the House from 18th February 1970 to 28th March 1970. No private members business was transacted in the Assembly upto that date since the days allotted by the Speaker for private members business were all after 28th March 1970. On 27th March 1970 there was a meeting of the Business advisory Committee which is a Committee constituted by the Speaker under Rule 190 of the Gujarat Legislative Assembly Rules made under Article 208(1) of the Constitution. This meeting was convened at the instance of the Minister for Parliamentary Affair and it was presided over by the Speaker. At this meeting a proposal was made that the Business Advisory Committee should recommend to the Assembly that the House be adjourned sine die after completing the business on 28th March 1970. The third petitioner who is a member of the Business Advisory Committee and who was present at this meeting opposed the proposal and in protest against it the third petitioner and other Members of the Business Advisory Committee who belonged to the Opposition walked out of the meeting. The Business Advisory Committee thereafter passed the following Resolution on the same day namely 27th March 1970;

(3.) Though the wording of the Resolution was that the House agrees with the recommendation of the Business Advisory Committee what the Resolution in effect and substance sought to achieve was adjournment of the House sine die since the recommendation of the Business Advisory Committee was that the House be adjourned sine die on 28th March 1970. The petitioners claimed that the House had no power by a majority of members present and voting to adjourn itself sine die and the Resolution passed by the House was therefore null and void and the Assembly did not stand adjourned. The petitioners accordingly filed the present petition challenging the validity of the Resolution and seeking inter alia an appropriate direction order or writ declaring that the Resolution is null and void the Assembly is not adjourned sine die on 28th March 1970 and the sitting of the Assembly is continuing and directing the Assembly to continue its sitting and the Speaker to arrange for the continuance of the sitting. The petition was lodged on 30th March 1970 and it came up for admission before a Division Bench consisting of P. D. Desai J. and myself on 31st March 1970. On that day we issued notice to the respondents to show cause why the petition should not be admitted. The notice was made returnable the next day. On 1st April 1970 the learned Advocate General appeared on behalf of the Assembly and the Speaker who are respectively respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and the learned Government Pleader appeared for the third respondent namely the Government. The learned Advocate General submitted that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain try and decide any of the issues raised in the petition because:- (1) each issue formed the subject matter of a ruling given by the Speaker and the ruling of the Speaker being immune from scrutiny by the Court under Article 212(2) no issue could be raised before the Court which involved examination of the correctness of the ruling of the Speaker; and (2) the petition sought to impeach or question a proceeding in the House of the Assembly but it was a privilege of the Assembly inherited from the House of Commons under Article 194(3) that its proceedings cannot be questioned or impeached outside the House and the Court was therefore not entitled to examine the validity of the proceeding. The argument occupied most of the time of the Court on that day and went on for a short while also on the next day. The learned advocate for the petitioners then started replying to the argument of the learned Advocate General. After the reply had proceeded for some time we felt that the questions raised were of great constitutional importance and it would be most undesirable to attempt to dispose them of at the admission stage without a full-fledged debate culminating in a reasoned judgment. We therefore decided to issue a rule on the petition. We pointed out to the learned Advocate General that should the Assembly and the Speaker desire we would first determine the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary contention. If it was decided in favour of the Assembly and the Speaker the petition would fail and there would be an end of it. But if it was decided otherwise the Assembly and the Speaker would have an opportunity to make a choice whether to contest the petition on merits or to withdraw from further participation in the proceedings. Having regard to the urgency of the matter we originally intended to make the rule returnable on 9th April 1970 but at the request of the learned Advocate General we fixed the returnable date on 20th April 1970.