E S I CORPORATION Vs. RAMADAS REDDIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question raised before us in these appeals is one covered by the Division Bench decisions of this court in MFA. 62 of 1978 and MFA. 378 of 1968 We would not have considered it necessary to go into the question over again had it not been for the fact that the question before us is an interesting one and learned counsel for the respondents in these cases attempted to throw fresh light on the question. In fairness to counsel Sri. Krishnamoorthy, we felt we should discuss the matter again in these appeals.

(2.) The question is no doubt simple. It concerns the applicability of the period of limitation to claims enforceable under the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act. Applications were moved by the respondents in these cases before the Employees' Insurance Court challenging the orders of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation made under S.45A of the Act in regard to liability for contribution under the Act for certain periods. One of the points urged in the applications was that the Corporation, in passing the orders under S.45A, had acted erroneously in that those orders were passed in respect of contributions due for periods more than 3 years prior to the date of the orders themselves. Though this contention had not been raised as such in the petitions before the Insurance Court, it seems to have been urged at the hearing and has been dealt with by the court. According to counsel just as S.77(1A) of the Act provides for a period of 3 years for filing an application before the Insurance Court, such period to commence from the date when the cause of action arose, there should be read a period of 3 years within which alone the Corporation could pass an order under S.45A. If it passes an order in respect of a period more than 3 years prior to the date of the order such order would be bad in that the amounts due as contribution would have become irrecoverable by that time and for that reason would not be a contribution enforceable by passing an order under S.45A.

(3.) It is not the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that there is any specific provision in the Act prescribing a period of time within which alone an order under S.45A could be passed. It is also not his case that S.77(1A) in terms applies to the passing of an order under S.45A.