ASMATH KHAN Vs. CHANDRAHASA BANGARA
LAWS(KER)-2006-9-1
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Decided on September 15,2006

ASMATH KHAN Appellant
VERSUS
CHADRAHASA BANGARA Respondents





Cited Judgements :-

ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY VS. DAVASIA [LAWS(KER)-2019-7-210] [REFERRED TO]
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD VS. IMRAN UMAR MUHAMMED [LAWS(KER)-2025-2-1] [REFERRED TO]
ANJALI VS. RAGESH [LAWS(KER)-2020-10-419] [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

- (1.)The appellant-petitioner met with an accident which resulted in fracture of his left lower limb. The Tribunal has calculated a compensation of Rs. 2,37,120/- and passed an award. Thereafter LA. No. 1219/98 was filed by the appellant under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure to correct an arithmetical error occurred in paragraph 20 in computation of annual income and consequently in the total amount of compensation awarded. The insurance company filed I.A.No. 1293/98 for reviewing the award as compensation was calculated for permanent disability at 40%, though 40% disability as per the certificate produced by the claimant himself is attributable only to the lower limb and not to the whole body. The Tribunal considered both the applications and allowed both the applications partly. Instead of Rs. 2,37,120/- originally awarded, the Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 2,49,520/-. Now the contention of the appellant-claimant is that the Tribunal cannot review the award passed for any reason. It can only correct a clerical or arithmetical error. As far as his application is concerned, it is only for correction of a mathematical error, whereas the application of the insurance company is for reviewing the award. The learned Counsel for the appellant also relied on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Abdul Majeed v. State of Kerala 2005 (2) KLT 434. In the above decision, it was held that the Tribunal has no power to review its own order. The above decision is contrary to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Rajan v. Sukumaran 1997 (1) KLT 686. The Division Bench, after considering the various decisions, held that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure could be followed by the Tribunal in the matter of review and in appropriate cases Tribunal has jurisdiction to review its own order.
(2.)It is submitted that the Division Bench in Rajan's case (supra) needs reconsideration. It was further submitted that the Apex Court in Patel Chunibhai v. Narayanrao held that a court or a Tribunal has no inherent power of review, unless such power is conferred by law either specifically or impliedly. Rule 395 of the Kerala Motor vehicles Rules specifically stated that certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. Rule 395 reads as follows:
395. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases:- The provisions of Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V, Rules 16 to 18 of Order VI, Order IX Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 1 to 21 of Order XVI, Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII and Order XXVI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal.

The argument of the appellant is that Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding power of review is not made applicable to the Tribunal and hence the Tribunal like a civil court cannot review its own order.

(3.)The procedure to be followed and powers of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are prescribed under Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 (for short 'the Act') which reads as follows:
169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.

(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and materials objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

(3) ...(Not applicable)

Under Section 169(2), the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a civil court. In Velunni v. Vellakutty 1989 (2) KLT 227 and other various cases, this Court had consistently held that in order to do justice for which it has been constituted, the Tribunal would have power to apply the principles underlining the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, even though not rendered specifically applicable. The Court also considered the fact that the Claims Tribunal is having all attributes and trapping of a civil court and it is deemed to be a civil court as specifically mentioned in Section 169(2). The Tribunal has been impliedly vested with power to review its own order to achieve the object of the Act and to avoid manifest injustice if circumstances as mentioned in Order XLVII exists. Same view taken by the Division Bench in Rajan's case (supra) was earlier also expressed by this court, not only regarding the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, but also other similar Tribunals which has the trapping of civil court, as can be seen from the following decisions. K.V. Aboo v. Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation 1977 ACJ 446, Abclulla v. Rent Controller 1984 KLT 865 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. George 1987 (2) KLT 776. Therefore there is no ground to refer the matte to the Full Bench. Decision in Rajan's case (supra) needs no reconsideration. The above decision of the Division Bench was not pointed out to the Single Bench. Hence decision in Abdul Majeed's case is overruled.



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